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I. INTRODUCTION
Billy Munnerlyn's 1969 Lear Jet was his pride and joy.1 When
1. ANDREW SCHNEIDER & MARY P. FLAHERTY, PRESUMED GUILTY: THE LAW'S
VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 31-32 (1991) (series published in THE PITTSBURGH PRESS,
Aug. 11-16, 1991) [hereinafter PRESUMED GUILTY].
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the government seized it, Munnerlyn went to court to get it back. He
sold everything he had, paid $85,000 in legal fees, proved his inno-
cence to a jury-and went bankrupt over it.
Munnerlyn, a veteran of 9,000 flights, had built a small business
flying executives, air freight and air ambulance runs. In the Fall of
1989, he flew a banker and four boxes of "financial records" from
Little Rock via Oklahoma City to Ontario, Canada. Three hours
after the flight, Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrested
Munnerlyn. The banker was, in fact, a convicted cocaine trafficker2
and the "financial records" were $2,795,685 in cash. Munnerlyn was
never charged with any wrongdoing. The government released him
seventy-one hours later, but kept his plane and the $8,500 charter
airfare. Federal prosecutors claimed the plane had been used to facili-
tate drug trafficking and therefore became property of the govern-
ment. Civil forfeiture law required no less.3
The government instituted forfeiture proceedings against the
plane. Munnerlyn did not dispute that his plane had carried a drug
dealer; however, he claimed "innocent ownership"-the only defense
available. Munnerlyn testified that he had never seen the man before
and that he never had anything to do with drugs. A jury found for
Munnerlyn and ruled that the plane be returned. The government
asked for a new trial and argued that witnesses who testified for Mun-
nerlyn had lied. Munnerlyn's attorneys responded with fifty-one affi-
davits supporting Munnerlyn's witnesses. The government's
attorneys offered Munnerlyn a deal: the government would return the
2. Id. at 31. In this case, the government later dropped charges against Munnerlyn's
passenger. See 60 Minutes: You're Under Arrest (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 5, 1992).
3. The section of the forfeiture statute applicable to Munnerlyn's airplane reads:
(A) SUBJECT PROPERTY
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them:... (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
4. Once the government showed probable cause that the plane was used to transport
drugs, the government was entitled to forfeit the plane. However, 28 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C)
provides that the government may not forfeit property if owners prove their innocence.
Specifically, "[n]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an
interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988). Together with parts of subsections (a)(6) and (a)(7), this
language is commonly called the "innocent owner provision" of the civil forfeiture statute.
Note that "innocent ownership" does not refer to "innocence" in the criminal sense of "not
guilty." Rather, it means that the owner was "without knowledge" that the property was
used to facilitate drug-dealing. See Part II.C., infra.
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plane if Munnerlyn paid $66,000. But Munnerlyn was almost broke;
he could not understand why he had to pay the government after a
jury had found in his favor. Munnerlyn's patience was running low;
his savings were running out. The government lowered the plane's
price to $30,000 and eventually to $6,500. In return, Munnerlyn
would get the plane, and the government would keep the $8,500
airfare. Of course, Munnerlyn would pay the $50,000 to bring the
idle plane back to FAA standards. He accepted the offer.5 The gov-
ernment never even mentioned the $80,000 Munnerlyn had spent in
legal fees. "If he was innocent, he would have taken reasonable steps
to avoid any involvement in illicit drug activity," said the Assistant
U.S. Attorney on Munnerlyn's case.6
The federal forfeiture statute for drug violations, 21 U.S.C.
§ 881,' does not provide attorney fees for innocent owners. When
5. Billy Munnerlyn accepted the government's last offer on December 18, 1991, just
before he was to testify at the second trial. Citizens Learn that Fighting Forfeiture Laws Is
Uphill Battle, UPI, Dec. 20, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
6. PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 32. The United States Supreme Court apparently
concurs with that assessment. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
687-88 (1974), the Court found that, "[t]o the extent that such forfeiture provisions are
applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing,
confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in
transferring possession of their property."
7. 21 U.S.C. § 881 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Subject Property
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property
right shall exist in them: ....
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used,
or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in
paragraph (1), (2), or (9), except that ....
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent
of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or
willful blindness of the owner. ...
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no
property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an
owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by
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Congress enacted § 881, it was "more concerned about seeing that the
government satisfy its costs of forfeiture from the proceeds of forfeited
property than about providing for the innocent owner's cost of
defense." 8 Congress authorized forfeiture, one of the most powerful
weapons in the government's arsenal in the continuing "war" on
drugs,9 to discourage "big-time" drug dealers by hitting them where it
hurts most.' 0 However, as in Munnerlyn's case, authorities some-
times hit innocent owners.11  A property owner can be financially
ruined12 after paying costly legal fees, even though all concerned par-
ties agree that the owner did nothing wrong. Those "who challenge
the government," said one forfeiture attorney, "have the choice of
fighting the full resources of the U.S. Treasury or caving in."1 3 If an
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter § 881].
8. United States v. Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F.2d 798, 799 (11 th Cir. 1991).
9. United States v. 28 Emery Street, 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990). In the words of Cary
H. Copeland, Director of the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture,
forfeiture is the war on drug's most important weapon. "It is to the drug war what smart
bombs and air power are to modem warfare." Dennis Cauchon, Government Doesn't Have to
Prove Guilt, USA TODAY, May 18, 1992, at 2A.
10. See, e.g., United States v. 2639 Meetinghouse Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 994 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (explaining that purpose of the Act is to strip the drug-trade of its instrumentalities); see
also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374
(noting that profit is the sole motivation for the drug trade and that economic power sustains
the criminal enterprise); Stephanie Saul, A House Could be the Price of a Joint Under Federal
Asset-Seizure Law, Los ANGELES TIMES, May 6, 1990, at A2 ("If we put the kingpins in
prison for life, it doesn't do much, but if we seize the instrumentalities of the drug trade, it's
like shutting down a manufacturing plant." (quoting Cary H. Copeland, Director of the Justice
Department's forfeiture program)).
Note, however, that the Federal Drug Administration's database shows that only 17% of
the 25,297 items seized between July 1989 and December 1990 were valued at more than
$50,000. Current law thus may have its most profound effect on people other than big-time
drug-dealers. PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 4.
11. An unscientific, ten-month study conducted by the Pittsburgh Press [hereinafter
Pittsburgh Press Study] documented 510 current forfeiture cases that involved "innocent"
people-or those possessing a very small amount of drugs-who lost their possessions.
PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 4.
12. See Alice M. O'Brien, Comment, "Caught in the Crossfire" Protecting the Innocent
Owner of Real Property from Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 521, 522 (1991).
13. Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty, Drug Law Leaves Trail of Innocents, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1991, at 1 (quoting Edward Hinson). Senator Domenici expressed such
concerns during the 1980 legislative hearings on the Equal Access to Justice Act:
The basic problem ... is the inability of many Americans to combat the vast
resources of the Government in administrative adjudication. In the usual case, a
party has to weigh the high cost of litigation or agency proceedings against the
value of the rights to be asserted. Individuals and small businesses are in far too
many cases forced to knuckle under to regulations even though they have a direct
and substantial impact because they cannot afford the adjudication process. In
[Vol. 47:147
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owner proves his innocence, his only remedy in most cases is the
return of the property. Almost always, the owner gets shafted with
the legal bill.
Billy Munnerlyn's case created quite a stir.'4 The Senate Judici-
ary Committee promptly announced that it would conduct an over-
sight hearing. The Committee proposed the hearing to give
prosecutors, attorneys, and others who deal with forfeiture laws an
opportunity to voice their concerns about those laws. 5 Not surpris-
ingly, the hearing was later cancelled on short notice and indefinitely
postponed because of "scheduling problems."' 6
One can argue that forfeiture is part of the war on drugs, and
that war demands sacrifices. Yet, it is unclear why random individu-
als-innocent owners-should make more sacrifices than others.
This Comment will show that current law occasionally singles out
innocent owners to bear the brunt of the "war on drugs."' 7 To rem-
many cases the Government can proceed in expectation of outlasting its
adversary.... [I]n many cases, [private litigants] find that even if they... win,
that they are losers because the attorneys' fees and cost that they have to pay to
defend against arbitrary and capricious acts of their Government, frequently
exceed the amount that is at issue.
Award ofAttorneys'Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 & Identical H.R.
6423 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1980) (testimony of Sen. Pete V.
Domenici, R-N.M.) [hereinafter Hearings]. Courts have also recognized the unequal strength
of private litigants and the United States Government. The Fourth Circuit found that:
[t]he United States is the strongest and most important party that appears before
us. It dwarfs all others in power, resources, and awesome responsibilities ....
When the government takes a position in litigation, it takes a position on behalf
of the people, and "the people" . . . includes the government's opponent in the
litigation.
United States v. Borromeo, 945 F.2d 750, 754 (4th Cir. 1991).
14. Billy Munnerlyn's case, first documented in the Pittsburgh Press story, supra note 1,
has since become national news through a segment on a prime-time network-TV news
magazine, focusing on the hardships created by the current forfeiture laws. See 60 Minutes:
You're Under Arrest, supra note 2.
15. The hearing was originally called for by Senator Arlen Specter, R-Pa, for the latter
part of May, 1992. Telephone Interview with David Lavallee, Press Secretary of the Senate
Judiciary Committee (Apr. 27, 1992); Telephone Interview with Richard Hertling, Staff Aide
to Senator Arlen Specter, R-Pa. (Apr. 27, 1992).
16. Telephone Interview with Arthur W. Leach, Assistant Director for Policy and
Legislation of the Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture (July 17, 1992). One may query
whether the fact that 1992 was an election year may have played a role in the postponement of
the hearing.
17. Legal commentators have bemoaned the harsh results caused by the forfeiture doctrine
for quite a while. See, eg., Peter A. Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War against
Drugs: What Process is Due? 41 Sw. L.J. 1111 (1988); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The
Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987). Many of these
commentators lament the absence of basic constitutional protections for owners of forfeitable
property. Some focus on the respective evidentiary burdens of the government and the
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edy the situation, this Comment proposes a way to compensate inno-
cent owners from government coffers, and so to spread the cost of the
war on drugs to the general citizenry. It suggests changes in the cur-
rent forfeiture laws to shift liability for a claimant's legal fees to the
government if the government does not prevail in its forfeiture
attempt. This Comment does not rehash the argument that the legal
rights of suspected drug-dealers merit better protections. Rather, the
proposed changes would help owners only after a court authorita-
tively determines that the property owner was not connected to any
illegal drug activity.
Part II of this Comment will demonstrate how the apparent sim-
plicity of current forfeiture procedure hides contradictions, inconsis-
tencies, and other fundamental shortcomings of civil forfeiture law."8
In particular, it will show how the deck is stacked against the inno-
cent owner. Part III will provide an overview of the history and cur-
rent rules regarding attorney fees. It will discuss the variations, the
policies, and the common effects of fee shifting under the current sys-
tem and will thus define a standard by which the suitability of specific
fee-shifting provisions may be judged. Part IV will use that standard
to appraise the limited means available today to shift fees away from
the successful claimant in forfeiture cases. Using the conclusions of
Parts II through IV, Part V will assess two possible variations of the
current law. It will propose the adoption of a one-way, pro-claimant
fee shift, which could relieve meritorious claimants by spreading the
cost of their attorney fees to the general citizenry.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION AND DOCTRINE OF
EXISTING FORFEITURE LAWS
A. 21 U.S.C. §881
The history of federal drug forfeiture law in general, and of § 881
in particular, has been one of steadily expanding scope and shrinking
procedural safeguards. Congress first enacted § 881 as part of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.19
innocent owner. One simply called forfeiture a "farrago of injustices sanctified by tradition"
and objected to the use of outdated and archaic concepts to deprive owners of their hard-
earned property. See David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 328, 331 (1988) (referring to forfeiture in the criminal context). This Comment
does not reiterate the complaints about forfeiture laws in general, but rather focuses on the
narrow issue of innocent ownership, which was raised vividly in Billy Munnerlyn's case, supra
note 1.
18. For a comprehensive treatise on forfeiture procedure, see generally DAVID B. SMITH,
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES (1991).
19. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1976). The law is also referred to as the
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The statute provided for forfeiture of raw materials, paraphernalia,
and vehicles used in the drug trade.2' In 1978, Congress extended the
breadth of § 881 to include as forfeitable items property furnished in
exchange for illegal drugs or proceeds traceable to such an
exchange.2 Perceiving a rising tide of drug trafficking in the early
1980s, Congress passed the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,22
which again extended § 881.23 The 1984 Act profoundly changed the
nature of § 881 by allowing governmental seizure of property used to
"facilitate" any felony drug violation under the Controlled Substances
Act. § 881 permitted the government to seize property prior to
charging or convicting the owner. By extending the government's
forfeiture powers, the legislators wanted to "include an attack on the
economic aspects of these crimes."' 24 The 1984 amendment had the
desired effect of rendering the statute a much more effective tool to
"Controlled Substances Act." The current version is codified in 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
20. The 1970 version of 21 U.S.C. § 881 provided for forfeiture of:
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed,
dispensed, or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment ....
(3) All property which is used, or intended for use, as a container for
property described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used
... to transport... property described in paragraph (1) or (2) ...
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1276, 1485 (1970).
21. The amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) included as forfeitable items:
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an
exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter ....
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982).
22. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act is substantially based on Pub. L. 98-473,
codified in provisions scattered throughout titles 5, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 23, 26, 28, 29, 42, and
49 U.S.C.
23. Revised § 881(a) subjected the following to forfeiture:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest in the whole of
any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used,
or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established
by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp. V 1987).
24. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3374.
1992]
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seize real and personal property.25 Today, § 881 is firmly entrenched
in the law as part of the broad effort to reduce the trade in illicit drugs
in the United States.26
Civil forfeiture is a strange creature. It is an odd mix of civil,
criminal and admiralty concepts.2 Still, forfeiture appears to be a
fairly straightforward concept. A civil forfeiture proceeding usually
begins with a government agency's 28 request for a warrant to seize the
defendant property.29 In many cases, the government can act without
warrant.3a The physical seizure of the property by government agents
and the transfer of title to the attorney general follow. In a second
phase, the attorney general files a complaint for forfeiture of the prop-
25. See Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil
Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 911, 925 (1991).
26. See generally Edith A. Landman & John Hieronymus, Civil Forfeiture of Real Property
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 70 MICH. Bus. L.J. 174 (1991).
27. Banks Can Prevail In Drug-Related Civil Forfeiture Actions Through Innocent Owner
Defense, PR Newswire, Nov. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Services File
(quoting Jane Moscowitz, a former federal prosecutor, who now works in private practice
concentrating on forfeiture cases).
28. Numerous federal agencies bring forfeiture proceedings for a variety of reasons. These
agencies include the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigations,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Postal Inspection Service, the Internal
Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the U.S. Park Police. See
generally DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG AGENTS GUIDE
TO FORFEITURE OF ASSETS (1987 & Supp. 1990). Sometimes, federal agencies seize property
in concert with local law enforcement, and occasionally federal agencies take over cases after
local agencies make the seizure. See id. at 99-105.
29. Note that § 881 relies on rules originally created in Admiralty for all forfeitures under
the statute. § 881(b) reads, in part:
(B) SEIZURE PURSUANT TO SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CERTAIN
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS; ISSUANCE OF WARRANT AUTHORIZING
SEIZURE
Any property subject to civil forfeiture to the United States under this
subchapter may be seized by the attorney General upon process issued pursuant
to the supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims by any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the property, except
that seizure without such process may be made when -
(1) the seizure is incident to an arrest or a search under a search warrant
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant ....
21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1988).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 881(b) states, in part, that:
seizure without such process may be made when: ....
(2) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment
in favor of the United States in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding
under this subchapter;
(3) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property is
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or
(4) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property is
subject to civil forfeiture under this subchapter.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
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erty.3 1 The third and final phase in a civil forfeiture proceeding, codi-
fied under § 881(d),32 is the forfeiture trial itself. The evidentiary
burdens of customs forfeiture proceedings govern the trial.33 To pre-
vail during a forfeiture trial, the government must merely show exist-
ence of probable cause to believe that the property had the requisite
connection to an illegal purpose.34 The issue of whether the owner is
31. The seizure stage in all § 881 forfeiture proceedings is regulated by the Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty and Maritime claims. Supplemental Rule E provides in part:
ACTIONS IN REM AND QUASI IN REM: GENERAL PROVISIONS
(1) APPLICABILITY. Except as otherwise provided, this rule applies to
actions in personam with process of maritime attachment and garnishment,
actions in rem, and petitory, possessory, and partition actions, supplementing
Rules B, C, and D.
(2) COMPLAINT; SECURITY.
(a) Complaint. In actions to which this rule is applicable the complaint
shall state the circumstances from which the claim arises with such particularity
that the defendant or claimant will be able, without moving for a more definite
statement, to commence an investigation of the facts and to frame a responsive
pleading.
Supplemental Rule E for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, (codified at 28 U.S.C.)
(Supp. 1991). For an example of how courts apply the rule in the forfeiture context, see
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 921 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1990).
32. § 881(d) reads:
(d) OTHER LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS APPLICABLE
The provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial
forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws; the
disposition of such property or the proceeds from the sale thereof; the remission
or mitigation of such forfeitures; and the compromise of claims shall apply to
seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under any of
the provisions of this subchapter, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with
the provisions hereof; except that such duties as are imposed upon the customs
officer or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property
under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and
forfeitures of property under this subchapter by such officers, agents, or other
persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney
General, except to the extent that such duties arise from seizures and forfeitures
effected by any customs officer.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
33. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 provides, in part:
BURDEN OF PROOF IN FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
In all suits or actions ... brought for the forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle,
aircraft, merchandise, or baggage . . . where the property is claimed by any
person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant ... : Provided, That
probable cause shall first be shown for the institution of such suit or action ....
19 U.S.C. § 1615 (Supp. 1991).
34. Id.; accord United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 101 (2nd Cir. 1990)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of government where government's unrebutted
affidavits showed reasonable grounds for forfeiture); cf United States v. 28 Emery Street, 914
F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing summary judgment where evidence was inconclusive
whether forfeited residence had substantial connection with drug offense). Some courts have
found that probable cause requires only a belief by a reasonable person that the property was
used to further the trafficking of illegal narcotics. See United States v. One 56-Foot Motor
1992]
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ever charged with," let alone convicted of, any wrongdoing, is insig-
nificant.36 If the government proves its case by showing probable
cause, the burden shifts to the person attempting to reclaim the for-
feitable property to rebut the government's evidence, 3 or to show that
the property was illegally used without the owner's knowledge or con-
sent ("innocent ownership"). 38 For both defenses, the claimant must
prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence to be entitled to the
return of her property.39
In spite of the apparent simplicity of the forfeiture laws, their
application raises some puzzling questions. The following section will
highlight the most controversial issues regarding the application of
these laws, and show how strongly they favor the government over an
innocent owner.
B. The Government's Case in Chief
1. PROBABLE CAUSE AS BURDEN OF PROOF
The probable cause standard is problematic as an ultimate bur-
den of proof. This purposely low standard,"° created for criminal law,
is not readily adaptable to a civil proceeding. Moreover, the use of
this standard in the civil forfeiture context, while greatly beneficial to
the government's case, is not entirely logical.
The forfeiture statute places the burden on the government to
Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming forfeiture of pleasure
yacht based on government affidavits). Other courts have found that the government must
have at least reasonable grounds, rising above the level of "mere suspicion," to believe that the
property is subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154,
1160 (2nd Cir. 1986). Note that the grounds "need not amount to what has been termed
'prima facie' proof." Id.
35. The Pittsburgh Press Study, supra note 11, showed that, in fact, 80% of the people who
lost property to the federal government were never charged. See PRESUMED GUILTY, supra
note 1, at 3.
36. "[J]udicial inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the owner [can] be dispensed with."
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) (outlining the
procedure for a probable cause determination).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 places on the claimant "the ultimate burden of proving that the
factual predicates for forfeiture have not been met." United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive,
897 F.2d 97, 101 (2nd Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d
at 1160); see also supra note 33.
38. See, e.g., United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 607-09 (2d Cir. 1982)
(reversing summary judgment and remanding for hearing on innocent ownership claim); see
also supra note 7, 28 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4)(C), (a)(6), and (a)(7).
39. See United States v. Fifty Thousand Dollars, 757 F.2d 103, 105 (6th Cir. 1985); see
also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3376
(noting that "[t]he 'preponderance of the evidence' standard of proof applies [to claimants] in
civil forfeitures as in other civil actions.").
40. See infra note 44.
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establish probable cause that the defendant property was used to facil-
itate illegal drug transactions.4" To meet this burden, the government
can rely on the "totality of the circumstances."42 Courts have gener-
ally defined probable cause as "reasonable ground for the belief of
guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere
suspicion. 43
The appropriateness of the probable cause standard in civil for-
feiture cases is questionable for several reasons: First, it is by no
means clear that the probable cause standard is suitable as a final bur-
den of proof in a civil case. In criminal cases, probable cause is a
preliminary showing that must be superseded with final proof beyond
a reasonable doubt." Criminal laws thus do not permit conviction
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. A cursory survey of civil forfeiture cases shows that the government usually uses one
or more of the following pieces of evidence: (a) Uncorroborated or corroborated tips from
informants; (b) Owner's (claimant's) behavior attracted attention because he (i) walked too
slowly, (ii) walked too fast, (iii) seemed too nervous, (iv) seemed too relaxed, (v) paid in cash,
(vi) bought one-way ticket, (vii) bought two-way ticket with return on the same day;
(c) Owner's personal or real property was used to store/transport drugs; (d) Owner carried
large amounts of cash or cash bundled in drug-dealer fashion; (e) Owner was present at a
suspected site; (f) Owner was previously convicted/indicted of drug offense; (g) Funds were
traceable to a narcotic exchange/transaction; (h) Alert of drug-detection dog caused suspicion.
The dog-alert is a commonly used piece of evidence, although it is highly problematic in
practice. Trained drug-dogs react to the smell of a controlled substance coming from currency
carried by the owner. Several studies, however, confirm that between 80% and 96% of all
U.S. currency is contaminated with cocaine. Traces of cocaine adhere to a contaminated bill
for weeks or months. Moreover, if the government seizes cocaine-contaminated currency, the
bills are not burned or otherwise destroyed. Oddly, the government frequently deposits the
bills with a local bank. Contaminated bills are thus re-circulated, and may be available for the
government to justify another forfeiture within a short time. See PRESUMED GUILTY, supra
note 1, at 15 (drawing on studies performed by Toxicology Consultants Inc., Miami, FL, and
National Medical Services, Willow Grove, PA).
43. United States v. 11348 Wyoming, 705 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Although the
government must connect the property it seeks to forfeit to illegal drug activity, courts have
consistently held that the government is not required to link the property to a particular drug
transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, Six
Hundred and Twenty-Five Dollars and Thirty-Nine Cents, 762 F.2d 895, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1985);
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986). The absence of such a requirement facilitates the
government's case immeasurably. An example is a drug dog alert to drug-contaminated
currency. Naturally, in such a case, the government is frequently unable to connect the
currency with a specific transaction.
44. The probable cause threshold in the criminal context is purposely minimal so as not to
hamper police investigations. Probable cause is required, for example, to obtain a search
warrant. The low evidentiary burden is justified because it only permits the search, and not the
conviction. In the civil forfeiture context, however, the government uses the probable cause
standard to establish its prima facie case, and thus frequently to meet its final burden of proof.
This use renders the low evidentiary burden highly problematic. Frequently, the government
can meet its burden of proof by simply qualifying one of its detectives as an expert, who then
testifies, for example, that a particular way of bundling money is typical for drug dealers.
Standing alone, such testimony may be enough for a showing of probable cause, and may
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after a mere showing of probable cause.45 Civil cases, on the other
hand, ordinarily require proof by a preponderance of the evidence for
either party to prevail. In a civil forfeiture, however, probable cause
alone suffices to prove the government's case. A person may thus be
deprived of her entire livelihood by civil forfeiture after a mere show-
ing of probable cause!"
Second, the probable cause standard is borrowed from a criminal
context. The distinction between criminal and civil forfeiture is cru-
cial, and the use of a criminal concept in a civil case can present
courts with vexing problems regarding the applicability of constitu-
tional protections.47
A third problem with the standard is that courts have admitted
evidence gathered after the seizure to establish probable cause in civil
forfeiture cases.4" In the criminal context, law enforcement officers
therefore entitle the government to forfeiture. In contrast, an innocent owner must adduce
massive evidence to prove her case. See PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 18, for an
example of a claimant who faced 14 individual discovery requests.
45. In fact, at least one state's highest court (Florida) has found that a showing of probable
cause is not enough under its state laws, which are modeled after the federal forfeiture statute,
to entitle the government to forfeiture. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property,
588 So. 2d 957, 967 (Fla. 1991) (requiring no less than clear and convincing evidence as burden
of proof).
46. Most states have similar statutes with the same probable cause burden of proof. A
notable exception is Florida, which requires "due proof" from the government. See FLA.
STAT. § 932.704(1) (1991). Until recently, Florida courts interpreted "due proof" to mean
"probable cause" in the forfeiture context. See Florida Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Lazzara,
580 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). However, in Department of Law Enforcement v. Real
Property, 588 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1991), the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the probable
cause standard is simply too low. "Accordingly," the court explained, " 'due proof' under the
[forfeiture] Act constitutionally means that the government may not take an individual's
property in forfeiture proceedings unless it proves, by no less than clear and convincing
evidence, that the property being forfeited was used in the commission of a crime." Id. at 967;
see also Fernandez v. McLane, 603 So.2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). While Department of Law
Enforcement could be an epochal decision if it induces other states to follow suit, local law
enforcement will most likely transfer lucrative cases to federal agents-and so share in the
bounty. See supra note 28.
47. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989) (discounting importance of civil-
criminal distinction in context of "humane" or "personal" interests); see infra part II.D. for a
more detailed discussion of this problem.
48. Post-seizure evidence is admitted because such evidence is collected before forfeiture,
but after seizure. A textual interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4), however, requires that
probable cause be present at the time of the seizure. The subsection provides that the Attorney
General can seize property if there is, "probable cause to believe that the property is subject to
civil forfeiture." Still, most courts freely consider evidence found after the seizure when
determining whether the government had probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. $37,780 in
U.S. Currency, 920 F.2d 159, 162-63 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no persuasive reason to bar use of
evidence obtained after seizure, such as criminal record, to show probable cause for forfeiture);
United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1162 (2d Cir. 1986) (determining
that government "need not demonstrate probable cause until the forfeiture trial"); United
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must show they had probable cause before or as they arrested a
defendant.49 This rule leads to careful investigation before action. In
the civil forfeiture context there are no such restrictions. 50  Law
enforcement can "act" by seizing the defendant property in the hope
of finding the necessary proof once the property is in their hands.51
The probable cause standard, a threshold requirement for police
action in criminal investigations, loses much of its logic if applied
after police action in the forfeiture context.
2. THE FACILITATION REQUIREMENT
One commentator has said that "nothing about the course of the
civil forfeiture juggernaut is more obfuscated" than the meaning of
"facilitation." 52 §§ 881(a)(6) and (7) of Title 21 provide forfeiture for
any property used to facilitate any violation of the statute. 53 Thus, the
meaning of "facilitation" is central to the government's case. Yet, the
federal circuits are hopelessly split in their interpretation of the term
"facilitation." At present, the federal circuits define "facilitation" in
nine different ways."4 Despite the existing confusion, the United
States v. One 1985 BMW 318i, 696 F. Supp. 336 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (rejecting owner's claim of
standing to challenge warrantless search as due process violation).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). The Court
required, "except in 'certain carefully defined classes of cases,' a magistrate's prior
authorization even where 'probable cause in the criminal law sense is not required.'" Id. at
555.
50. See generally Michael E. Herz, Note, Forfeiture Seizures and the Warrant
Requirement, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 960 (1981); See also Winn, supra note 17.
51. For example, standard police procedure at airports around the country entails
approaching ticket-buyers after they pay for expensive tickets with cash. Police usually ask the
ticket-buyers for consent to search their belongings. If the search or the reaction of the
traveller reveals anything "suspicious," police will intensify the search, for example, by
bringing in a drug-detection-dog. At that point, police often seize currency carried by the
ticket-buyer. After the seizure, investigators frequently search for more evidence, which will
routinely be admitted into evidence in subsequent forfeiture hearings. See, e.g., Fletcher v.
Metro-Dade Police Dep't Law Enforcement Trust Fund, 593 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Although Fletcher arose under state law, the facts of the case give a good impression of
standard police procedure. See also PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 22.
52. Steven S. Biss, Substantial Connection and the Illusive Facilitation Element for Civil
Forfeiture of Narcoband in Drug Felony Cases, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 171, 172 (1990).
53. See supra note 7.
54. Id.. The First Circuit uses the "antecedent relationship" plus "integral part" test. See
United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Corvette, 625 F.2d 1026, 1029 (1st Cir. 1980) (reversing
forfeiture of car used to drive a banker to prearranged location to receive up-front payment for
a drug transaction because the car did not have an antecedent relationship to the sale of
narcotics). The Second Circuit follows with the "sufficient nexus" standard. See United States
v. 4492 South Livonia Road, 889 F.2d 1258, 1269 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving forfeiture of
residence containing small quantities of drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, and currency,
because it had a sufficient nexus to illegal narcotics activity). The Third and Fourth Circuits
apply the "substantial connection" test. See United States v. Certain Lots in Virginia Beach,
657 F. Supp. 1062, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1987) (reversing forfeiture of a residence because the home
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States Supreme Court has refused to settle the issue." The silence of
the Supreme Court on this issue is perhaps paradigmatic for the
Court's unwillingness or inability to clear up the contradictions inher-
ent in the current forfeiture laws. Perhaps the Court cannot reconcile
these contradictions without depriving the government of the edge it
currently enjoys.
3. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Civil forfeiture cases are far easier for the government to win
than other cases because some of the evidentiary safeguards that are
considered essential in other areas of litigation are discarded in the
forfeiture context. These safeguards exist to keep unreliable evidence
out of the courtroom; it is not entirely clear why they should not
apply in forfeiture proceedings. Most strikingly, the government may
did not have substantial connection to illegal drug-activity); United States v. Schifferli, 895
F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming forfeiture of office where dentist had written over forty
illegal prescriptions because the office had a substantial connection to illegal activity). The
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits rely on the "in any manner" test. See United States v. 1964
Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nor. Preston v.
U.S., 461 U.S. 914 (1983) (approving forfeiture of airplane after the owner transported a drug
dealer because plane was property used in any manner to facilitate drug-dealing); United States
v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1979) (upholding forfeiture of car
used to drive to a pawn shop where the car's owner bought drugs); United States v. 916
Douglas Avenue, 903 F.2d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Born v. U.S., 111
S.Ct. 1090 (1991)(finding forfeiture of home proper where undercover agent had called home
several times to set up drug buys). The Eighth Circuit uses a "de minimis" test. See United
States v. One Red Ferrari, 875 F.2d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming forfeiture of sports car
where owner had cocaine in his pocket while driving, although owner's misdeed was de
minimis, or minute). The Ninth Circuit applies the "aggregate of the facts" test. See United
States v. Padilla, 888 F.2d 642, 643 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding property subject to forfeiture if the
aggregate of the facts links property to drug-activity). The Tenth Circuit looks for "purpose"
and "subsequent distribution." See United States v. One 1987 Ford F-350 4x4 Pickup, 739 F.
Supp. 554, 559 (D.Kan. 1990) (upholding forfeiture of pickup truck driven to two drug
locations because it facilitated the delivery and subsequent distribution of drugs). The
Eleventh Circuit uses the "cover" test. See United States v. Rivera, 884 F.2d 544, 546 (11 th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1322 (1990) (approving forfeiture of farm and contents
because it was used as cover for drug enterprise). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
.and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have not yet addressed the exact
meaning of "facilitation" and currently permit juries or judges to decide whether property was
used to facilitate a drug violation. See United States v. One 1989 Cadillac Coupe De Ville, 833
F.2d 994, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (upholding jury verdict that a vehicle "was not used to facilitate
a drug transaction"); United States v. Favawora, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1989) cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989) (finding definition of "to facilitate" unnecessary where probable
cause was met under other, more stringent standard).
55. See, e.g., United States v. 916 Douglas Avenue, 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied sub nom. Born v. U.S., 111 S.Ct. 1090 (1991); United States v. Rivera, 884 F.2d 544,
545-46 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1322 (1990); United States v. Favawora, 865
F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989); United States v. 1964
Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nor. Preston v. U.S.,
461 U.S. 914 (1983).
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use hearsay evidence to establish probable cause. It may introduce,
for example, statements of confidential informants, presented to the
court by any member of its police force, to establish its claims.5 6 In
contrast, the innocent owner seeking to establish his defense may not
introduce hearsay evidence."
Courts admit hearsay evidence because "the question of probable
cause depends not upon the admissibility of the evidence upon which
the government relies, but only upon the legal sufficiency and reliabil-
ity of evidence."58 This reasoning derives directly from the eviden-
tiary requirements for probable cause determinations in the criminal
context.59 However, courts admit hearsay in criminal cases for the
purpose of showing probable cause only because such a showing is a
preliminary element: it shows that the arrest or investigation was
proper.6° In a civil forfeiture case, on the other hand, probable cause
may be all the government needs to show in order to win the entire
case. 61 With hearsay evidence admitted to show probable cause, and
with probable cause as final burden of proof, reliability of evidence
issues loom large. 62 The absence of evidentiary protections gives the
government another edge over the claimant.
56. In a telling example, the Second Circuit said, "[a]ppellant contends, however, that the
district court could not properly rely on out-of-court statements attributed to an unidentified
confidential informant. We disagree, at least insofar as this evidence was considered on the
issue of probable cause." United States v. 15 Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 101. (2d Cir.
1990). But see United States v. 28 Emery Street, 914 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that
hearsay may be considered by a court in evaluating probable cause to forfeit only if there is a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay).
57. United States v. All Monies ($477.048.62) in Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp.
1467, 1471 (D. Hawaii 1991); United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 622 (3d Cir.
1989).
58. United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th
Cir. 1983).
59. E.g., United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding inadmissible
hearsay not necessarily improper to show probable cause in criminal case).
60. The use of the full range of adversary safeguards, such as the right to confront the
accuser in court, is not essential in a probable cause hearing. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
120 (1975). No interest would be served by formalism in this process. Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972) (noting that statements of confidential informant may be admitted in
parole revocation hearing).
61. The government's probable cause showing is enough to conclude the case if the
claimant cannot rebut it or introduce sufficient evidence of innocent ownership. See United
States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 816-17 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment
in government's favor where owner could not rebut essential elements in government's
affidavit).
62. It appears that the government need not be concerned with Confrontation Clause
problems. The owner's right to face her accuser should not apply to civil proceedings. After
all, the property is "accused" and not the owner.
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C. Innocent Ownership
If the government shows probable cause, the claimant may offer
evidence of "innocent ownership. ' 63 For several reasons, the inno-
cent ownership defense does not effectively protect the "innocent"
owner. First, the defense does not afford protections to every owner
who is "innocent"-in the sense of "not guilty"--of drug-dealing.
"Innocent" in the forfeiture context means that the owner's property
was used in violation of the statute without the owner's knowledge or
consent.64 By that standard, a claimant is innocent in many cases. A
good example of an innocent owner is the landlord whose tenant dealt
drugs without the landlord's knowledge.65 Yet the innocent owner
63. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. In contrast to the government, which
merely must show probable cause, the owner must meet a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. Some litigants have fought this shift in the burden of proof as a violation of due
process by claiming that it was unfair and at odds with ordinary civil practice. See, e.g., United
States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1267-1268 (2d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 897 F.2d
659 (1990) (rejecting criticism of probable cause standard in civil forfeiture context).
However, appellate courts have been less than receptive to such claims, pointing to historical
acceptance or statutory intent. See, e.g., United States v. 250,000 in U.S. Currency, 808 F.2d
895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting argument that use of probable cause as burden of proof in
civil proceedings violates due process).
For a general discussion of the constitutional implications of shifting of evidentiary
burdens, see Peter Petrou, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in
Forfeiture Proceedings Arising out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE L.J. 822.
64. See supra notes 33 & 34. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld the application of Puerto Rico's forfeiture statute to a
yacht leased to drug traffickers. The Court expressly left open the possibility that the forfeiture
might have been denied if the owner could prove he was innocent of the crime and did all that
could be reasonably expected to prevent misuse of his property. Id. at 689. The Court, in
dicta, suggested that statutes such as § 881 could not constitutionally apply to innocent
owners. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would allow use of forfeiture proceedings for
oppressive purposes beyond the legitimate intent of the statutes. Id. at 689-90. However, the
Court stopped short of providing a rule for determining "innocence" for an owner in the
forfeiture context. The "innocent owner" defense, originally referred to as the "Calero-
Toledo" defense, is an integral part of today's forfeiture statute. See supra note 4.
65. Because lack of knowledge is one of the elements establishing innocent ownership, a
landlord may be well advised to consciously ignore drug dealing by her tenants. Otherwise,
she may share the fate of Lincoln Adair, the landlord of a building on East Sixth Street in
Manhattan. He heard rumors that one of his tenants was dealing drugs from the rented
property. Adair informed police and began eviction proceedings. The suspected drug dealers
operated the East Side Deli from the ground floor of Adair's building. Police raided the deli
three times and made seven arrests. Later, a squad of federal law enforcement officers
descended on the deli and seized it with its contents, potato salad and all. After considerable
litigation, the government offered to return the property-if Adair paid them $4,000 in
management fees for the closed deli. Adair resisted. According to Adair, the federal officers
shut off the utilities after they seized the delicatessen. Food rotted, Adair said, and pipes burst
when the weather got cold. Rather than pay the government, Adair wanted the government to
pay him $3,100 in repairs. After six months, Adair got his deli back. The government paid
him $1,500, but he was left to do the repairs. Paul Moses, Fighting for Their Buildings,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 1990, at 4.
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may not be able to gather enough evidence to prove she knew nothing
of the drug transactions on her property. Second, it is not entirely
clear how ignorant an owner may or must be in order to be considered
"without knowledge. ' 66 Frequently, courts hold owners responsible
to do "all that could be reasonably expected to prevent misuse of his
property. 67 In United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV,68 the
court discussed the owner's duty in great detail. The court found that
any knowledge or even suspicion may trigger an affirmative duty on
the part of the owner to prevent illegal use of the property. 69 That
standard compels an owner either to remain completely ignorant or to
take action against the suspected drug dealers, neither entirely satisfy-
ing prospects. One practicing attorney has suggested that to force an
owner to do "all that could be reasonably expected" is to give the
owner the role of law enforcer. 70 Most observers agree that the inno-
cent owner is fighting an uphill battle against the government, and
that the innocent owner defense cannot effectively shield the owner
from governmental overreaching.71
D. Constitutional Problems
Several of the most basic individual rights are protected by the
Constitution only in the criminal context.72 When adopting the 1984
amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 881, Congress characterized the criminal
justice system as one of "ambiguities" and "limitations", and tried to
clear the legal path for civil forfeitures.73 Apparently, hardliners in
Congress wanted to "bypass entirely the cumbersome criminal justice
66. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 523, 529.
67. United States v. One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d 603, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1982). Federal
courts recognize that the innocent owner provision in today's § 881 is part of common law as
well. They accept the dicta in Calero- Toledo, as "in accord with the policy and history of civil
forfeiture in this country." Id. at 607.
68. 462 F. Supp. 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
69. Id. at 1387.
70. See Moses, supra note 65. As forfeiture attorney Jay Litzman noted: "I believe that it
puts an unfair burden on the landlord to play police. It's a very, very dangerous situation.
There are landlords who are afraid to do anything. They don't know which way to turn." Id.
One can only wonder about the propriety of compelling private citizens to act (e.g. search) in
ways the police can not constitutionally act.
71. See, e.g., G. Richard Strafer, Civil Forfeitures. Protecting the Innocent Owner, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 841 (1985).
72. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." (emphasis added).
73. During congressional discussions regarding the 1984 amendment to § 881, legislators
said that "[t]his bill is intended to eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that have
frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement agencies." S. REP. No. 225
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3375.
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system, with its tedious set of impediments to investigation, prosecu-
tion, and conviction, and substitute a control system consisting of
civil sanctions."'7 4 However, the distinction between civil and crimi-
nal proceedings is not clear-cut. The Supreme Court has, for exam-
ple, held that forfeiture proceedings are sufficiently criminal that the
property owner can claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.75 Other constitutional rights,
such as the right to a jury trial,76 the provision against cruel and unu-
sual punishment,"" and the provision against double jeopardy7" have
rarely or never been successfully asserted in the civil forfeiture
arena. 79 Various commentators have attempted to define which pro-
ceedings are criminal and which are civil. Some have argued that
laws serving primarily to punish are criminal in nature.80 However,
74. One commentator uses this language rhetorically to give an example of a typical stance
of forfeiture hardliners. See Wisotsky, supra note 17, at 925.
75. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd, as part of its holding, affirmed the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for claimants in forfeiture proceedings.
However, the modem forfeiture claimant is ill-advised to remain silent, because the claimant
usually has the burden of proof to show innocent ownership. With the claimant invoking Fifth
Amendment protections, the government may win in summary fashion.
76. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions. the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI,
cl. 1. The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... U.S.
CONST. amend. VII, cl. I.
77. The Eighth Amendment commands that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VIII. One could argue that the government's practice of forfeiting entire properties for
apparently minor infractions is unusual, or even cruel, punishment. See, e.g., United States v.
508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992) ("reluctantly" holding that
proportionality analysis is inappropriate in civil forfeiture proceeding); United States v. Tax
Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming forfeiture of land worth $95,000 used to
grow marijuana plants worth less than $1,000); United States v. One Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d
810 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding forfeiture of sportscar because it was found to contain .226
grams of marijuana).
78. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person.., shall.., be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2. The
double jeopardy issue arises frequently in the forfeiture context, where a defendant may be
subjected to a criminal trial for participation in drug-activity, as well as to civil proceedings to
forfeit tainted property. Because the burden of proof in criminal cases is beyond a reasonable
doubt, an acquittal of the owner on criminal charges has no collateral estoppel effect on the
civil forfeiture case, where the government needs to show only probable cause to establish its
case. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (permitting civil
forfeiture after acquittal on criminal charges arising out of the same circumstances).
79. See, e.g., id.; 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d at 814; United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861
F.2d at 232; United States v. One Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d at 810.
80. See, e.g., J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework
for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 385-86 (1976); see also Lawrence A.
Kasten, Note, Extending Constitutional Protection to Civil Forfeitures that Exceed Rough
Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194 (1991) (arguing that, where forfeiture
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this distinction creates problems in areas such as civil forfeiture,
where the forfeiture arguably is punitive.81 The Supreme Court has
sought to distinguish civil and criminal punishments through a seven-
prong test.82 Paradoxically, civil forfeiture sanctions fit the test in
several respects, 3 and the Court has yet to explain how an action it
calls civil can essentially fit the definition given for criminal actions.
What the Supreme Court did explain is that forfeiture laws may not
violate due process even if they are made applicable to property inter-
ests of innocent owners.84 The Supreme Court noted that "confisca-
tion may have the desirable effect of inducing [owners] to exercise
greater care in transferring possession of their property."85
punishes, rather than deprives offenders of ill-gotten gains, constitutionally established
criminal procedures and safeguards should apply).
81. "It is clear that certain proceedings, even though statutorily or judicially labeled 'civil,'
in reality exact punishments at least as severe as those authorized by the criminal law." Mary
M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325,
1350 (1991); "Civil forfeiture is penal in nature." Biss, supra note 52, at 177; In the legislative
history to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress stated: "The extremely
lucrative nature of drug trafficking is well established, and indeed is a primary reason why the
forfeiture of the proceeds of drug transactions is necessary to effectively deter and punish such
conduct." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3395.
82. The factors to be considered when deciding whether a punishment is criminal or civil
in nature are (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, (3) whether a finding of scienter is
required for its application, (4) whether the punishment will promote the traditional aims of
retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to which it applies already is a crime,
(6) whether it serves an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected, and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to that alternative purpose. Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
83. Factors (2), (3), (4), and (5), discussed at supra note 82, arguably qualify civil
forfeiture as criminal. Forfeiture has historically been regarded as "punishment." See Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974); see also Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (finding civil forfeitures sufficiently punitive to be labeled quasi-criminal).
Because the innocent owner can block forfeiture by a showing of ignorance, it can be said that
forfeiture requires scienter. See supra text accompanying note 69. Congress has stated that
retribution and deterrence are goals of tough forfeiture laws. See Legislative History to the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which emphasizes the necessity for tough forfeiture laws
because traditional sanctions inadequately "deter and punish." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374. The drug-violation underlying
the forfeiture already constitutes a crime. Note that the Mendoza-Martinez Court formulated
this test in dicta, and that it did not rely on the test in its decision. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 169.
84. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974). In Calero Toledo,
renters used a yacht under a long-term lease. The yacht was forfeited because a single
marijuana cigarette was found on it. The owner was not accused of any involvement in or even
knowledge of the drugs. Id. at 665-68.
85. Id. at 688. One may disagree with the Supreme Court on this point. It is debatable
whether owners of yachts or operators of private airlines even have the capacity to "take
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E. Outdated Dogma
The personification fiction,86 carried into today's forfeiture laws
from ancient dogma, can leave a property owner exposed to govern-
mental overreaching against the property itself. Forfeiture, rooted
deeply in common law, 7 most likely sprang from the English com-
mon law action of deodand, where the instrumentality of a crime
automatically fell to the crown.88 The deodand concept bore the seeds
for two of the most troublesome features of today's forfeiture doc-
trine: the "in rem proceeding" and the "taint doctrine".
Civil forfeiture proceedings are in rem, directed against the prop-
erty and not against the owner.8 9 Under this personification fiction,
only the "guilt" of the property is at issue.90 Thus, if a home has been
used to facilitate drug-transactions, the house falls to the government,
no matter what the actual owner's contribution was. The governmen-
tal action "against the home" may be entirely appropriate while such
action would be entirely inappropriate against the owner herself.
Under the taint doctrine, if property has been touched or
"tainted" by drugs, the ownership rights to such property immedi-
ately vest in the government.91 Therefore, any transaction involving
greater care" to prevent their lessees from carrying marijuana cigarettes or large amounts of
cash in their luggage.
86. James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 768, 782 (1977) (coining the expression "personification fiction").
87. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 24-25 (1881). For an in-depth expos6 of forfeiture under common law, see
William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connel, Jr., In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and
Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11
PEPP. L. REV. 613, 619-24 (1984).
88. See Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands,
Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L. Q. 169, 185
(1973).
89. Courts use the in rem characterization to circumvent decisions such as Boyd, supra
note 70. In the blunt terms of one court, "it is this historic characterization [as an in rem
action] which permits admiralty forfeitures, and civil forfeitures in general, to escape the
stricture of the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Veon, 538 F.
Supp. 237, 242 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
90. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974). The
Supreme Court, in Calero-Toledo noted that the origins of the notion that a thing can be
"guilty" may be found in the Bible at EXODUS 21:28-30: "[If an ox gore a man or a woman,
and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at
681 n.17. Billy Munnerlyn, the pilot, expressed the concept in less gory terms: "They said
they arrested the airplane for hauling money. Something I don't understand today." 60
Minutes: You're Under Arrest, supra note 2.
91. "All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall
vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section." 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988).
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tainted property is subject to the rights of the government. 92 A trans-
fer or other legal maneuver that takes place after the taint will not
spare the property. 93 At the same time, any legal rights attached to a
property at the time of the taint, such as liens on a forfeitable home,
retain a priority position. The taint doctrine has been compared to
"demonic possession" 94 because property, once tainted, can be purged
only by the forfeiture ritual. A property owner who becomes aware
that her property, be it money, cars, or real estate, has been used for
illegal purposes, cannot take any action to protect her own interests.
Some commentators and cases have called the fiction a "perver-
sion;" 95 others described it as "superstitious,"96 "repugnant,"97 and a
legal "curiosity."98 Yet, the in rem forfeiture proceeding and the taint
doctrine are alive and well today. For the innocent owner, they are
just part of the obstacle course he must run to obtain return of his
property and to be made whole for all losses stemming from govern-
ment action.
F. The Second Coming of Forfeiture
Considering the shortcomings of the present forfeiture laws, one
might expect Congress or the Supreme Court to take corrective
action. Yet, one waits in vain.99 For some untold reason, neither
Congress, nor the courts, nor law enforcement have any interest in
adding protections for individuals to civil forfeiture proceedings.
Every amendment to § 881 in the past twenty years has expanded
governmental powers at the cost of individual freedoms. 1°° The con-
92. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16 (1890); see infra notes 131, 207-09 and
accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911, 946 F.2d 30, 35 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting owner's defense that sportscar was payment to attorney for defense against forfeiture
of the car). But see United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1260, and cert. denied sub. nonm Goodwin v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1264
(1992) (recognizing claims of innocent donnees of tainted monies).
94. See Piety, supra note 25, at 917.
95. WILLIAM SEAGLE, THE QUEST FOR LAW 126 (1941) (referring to deodand).
96. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921).
97. Parker Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916).
98. Finkelstein, supra note 88, at 170 (quoting CARLTON K. ALLEN, LAW IN THE
MAKING 330 (7th ed. 1964)).
99. The Senate Judiciary Committee oversight hearing relating to civil forfeiture, planned
for May, 1992, was cancelled on short notice. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Even
before the hearing was cancelled, one senate aide expressed his opinion on current forfeiture
law as follows: "We don't really think there is anything wrong with the laws, but we want to
let those who work with these laws on a daily basis tell us what they think." Telephone
Interview with Richard Hertling, Staff Aide to Senator Arlen Specter, R-Pa. (Apr. 27, 1992).
100. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text. The usually polarized Congress was
unified in its approval of expanded forfeiture powers for the government in the Comprehensive
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cept of forfeiture has existed for hundreds of years, 101 but the number
of forfeitures of property involved in criminal acts has mushroomed
in recent years.102 The search for the ultimate reason for this sudden
revival of forfeiture would be singularly unsuccessful if limited to
legal literature. A survey of press sources proves much more fruitful
and may provide some possible explanations for the sudden popular-
ity of forfeiture law. 103
The government may try to justify the recent surge in crime-
related forfeitures as a necessary feature of the government's "war on
drugs." While strict forfeiture laws have not led to a noticeable
downturn in drug activity in recent years, 1°4 police and politicians are
nevertheless convinced that forfeitures are a very effective bulwark
against the tide of drugs entering this country, and they vow to press
on. 105 Yet, there seems to be another, more forceful motivation
behind the sudden popularity of forfeitures than the desire to stop
drug dealers. After all, politicians in the past have consistently vowed
to fight crime with iron fists, but have been more careful in their
choice of words when costly legislation was on the table. Forfeiture
laws are different. Forfeitures are money makers. In 1990, proceeds
Crime Control Act of 1984. The legislative history of the act notes, albeit in a boilerplate
statement, that "[improvement of the forfeiture laws is of bipartisan concern." S. Rep. No.
225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S;C.C.A.N 3182, 3375.
101. See supra notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text.
102. From 1985 to 1991, the value of properties seized nation-wide has increased by 99%.
Since 1985, more than $2.4 billion worth of property has been forfeited. See Annual Report of
the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Program, 1991, Foreword. As of April, 1991, the
seizures had given the U.S. Marshals Service "a bulging $1.4 billion inventory of more than
30,000 homes, cars, airplanes, yachts, businesses and other items-including 1,800 cases of
jewelry, 62 horses and cattle, 96 art works and antiques and 26 cases of baseball cards."
Michael Isikoff, Drug Raids Net Much Valuable Property-and Legal Uproar, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 1991, at Al. The U.S. Justice Department alone generated $1.5 billion from forfeitures
between 1986 and 1990. See PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 5.
103. Most forfeiture cases are settled or disposed of without ever reaching the appellate
stage. Therefore, many of the more shocking cases are never reported in legal publications. In
order to use those cases as illustrations, it is necessary to draw on sources not frequently used
in law review articles. In addition to the usual legal sources, this article also relies on press-
reports (or true to fashion, "storytelling") regarding individual forfeitures. Because of the
tendency of such reports to be somewhat less specific than legally reported materials, the
reader is encouraged to interpret them for what they are - anecdotes rather than precedents.
104. Stanley E. Morris, Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, said "the reality is, it's very difficult to tell
what the impact of drug seizure and forfeiture is." Andrew Schneider & Mary P. Flaherty,
Drug Law Leaves Trail of Innocents - In 80% of Seizures, No Charges, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11,
1991, at 1.
105. Frederick E. Dashiell, Chief of the U.S. Attorney's Asset Division, said: "We're going
to maximize forfeitures until we can stop the drug traffickers who are out there causing
problems in the communities." Sean P. Murphy, Forfeitures Help Finance the War on Drugs,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1991, at 21.
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from forfeitures paid for ten percent of federal law enforcement
costs."° A trickle-down provision built into the forfeiture statute"°7
provides a rich, new source of income for local law enforcement agen-
cies who crack cases alongside their federal counterparts.10 8 If the
police are funded with forfeiture money, less tax money needs to be
appropriated to support the departments. 109 Politicians who vow to
levy "no new taxes" are understandably delighted by this sudden new
source of revenue. Apparently because the laws are politically safe,
and because they make their proponents appear "tough on crime,"
many politicians support the current civil forfeiture laws. Moreover,
most constituents consider it poetic justice that the government can
use some money made from the drug dealers' old houses to build their
new houses (jails)." 0 Time and again, amendments expanding gov-
ernment power in forfeiture cases have sailed smoothly through
Congress. " ' I
A final reason for the sudden popularity of forfeitures is the fact
that law enforcement agencies have only recently learned how to
106. Id.
107. § 881(e)(1) provides, in part:
The Attorney General may ... (A) retain the property for official use or, in the
manner provided with respect to transfers under section 1616a of title 19,
transfer property to a Federal agency or to any State or local law enforcement
agency which participated directly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
108. Lorne C. Kramer of the Los Angeles Police Department's Bureau of Special
Investigations, praised the increased cooperation between local and federal law enforcement in
cases with prospective forfeitures. "It has been the catalyst to create a more harmonious
working relationship between local and federal enforcement agencies," Kramer said. "I can't
think of a time when there was such a close, cooperative working relationship with so many
federal agencies as we have now," Kramer added. Crime is Paying Local Dividends, THE
NAT'L J., Feb. 25, 1989, Vol. 21, No. 8, at 474.
109. Some police officials believe that state legislatures now approve less money for law
enforcement because they expect that proceeds from the asset forfeiture program will make up
the difference. "State policy makers consider [the forfeiture income] when drawing up
budgets," said Tim Moore, Commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement,
"even though it is contrary to the substantive law in this state." Id. The training manual for
federal drug agents, published by the U.S. Department of Justice, states the same proposition:
[F]orfeitures produce vast amounts of revenue. Law enforcement has the
potential, through forfeiture, of producing more income than it spends. With tax
dollars becoming scarce, forfeiture holds the promise of improving drug
enforcement and the method to use the assets of violators to support enforcement
activities.... The long-range implications are enormous.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DRUG AGENTS GUIDE TO FOR-
FEITURE OF ASSETS 1 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
110. War on Drugs Now 'Hitting Home, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1989, at 3.
Il1. Drafts of the forfeiture provisions in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
for example, passed the Senate by a vote of 95 - 1 and the House by 271 - 27. S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3375.
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manage and dispose of seized property. In the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984,112 Congress centralized the responsibility for
management and disposition of forfeited property with the U.S. Mar-
shal's Service." 3 Before the Act, law enforcement officials tended to
shy away from seizing assets difficult to manage.' 1 4  Now, law
enforcement agencies can confiscate properties such as a 4000-tree
macadamia nut plantation in Hawaii, a brass and aluminum foundry,
and a golf course. 15
The preceding quandaries demonstrate the problems inherent in
the current forfeiture laws. The existing laws present no disincentive
to governmental overreaching. Innocent owners deserve protection
against the effects of. misguided government action. Yet, all signs
indicate that political considerations take precedence over individual
rights in the civil forfeiture context. With a view to this reality, this
Comment does not propose radical changes to § 881, but rather seeks
to make innocent owners whole in individual cases after § 881 runs its
course. The goal is to achieve fairness by obligating the government
to compensate those it injures. Payment of legal fees by the govern-
ment may prove to be an effective way to cure some of the ailments of
§ 881.
III. SHIFTING CONSIDERATIONS
Litigation in the United States is frequently said to follow the
"American rule" of attorney fee allocation, a system where each party
pays its own way. This system differs from the "English rule," where
the loser pays the winner's attorney fees. In reality, the United States
uses a system that lies somewhere in between the "American" and the
"English" rule. 116 For historical reasons, litigants in the United
States generally pay their own fees, but the practice has been sub-
jected to so many exceptions that this system of fee allocation is no
longer a pure form. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soci-
112. Supra note 22.
113. The legislative history to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 explains that:
Section 317 (of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984] amends the Tariff
Act by creating a new section that will provide for the deposit of the proceeds of
forfeitures under the customs laws [which include civil forfeitures] into a
Customs Forfeiture Fund which is to be available for the payment of expenses
associated with forfeiture actions.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3402. The
U.S. Marshal's Service administers the Customs Forfeiture Fund pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1921(c)(1).
114. War on Drugs Now 'Hitting Home, supra note 110, at 3.
115. Id.
116. JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 301 (2d ed. 1988).
[Vol. 47:147
CIVIL FORFEITURE
ety 1 7 the Supreme Court defined the practice in the United States:
Absent a contractual agreement stating otherwise, or absent specific
statutory authority for fee shifting, each party pays its own fees. As
noted in Alyeska, numerous state and federal fee-shifting statutes are
designed to promote policies of general fairness and access to
justice.' 18
This Comment will propose another statutory fee-shifting provi-
sion, one that would promote fairness and ensure access to justice for
innocent owners. However, before considering the addition of
another fee-shifting exception to the American rule, one should
understand why the United States developed the American rule in the
first place. In particular, one must consider whether the historic justi-
fications for the American rule override arguments for fee shifting in
the civil forfeiture context. Toward that end, this Part will first briefly
trace the history of attorney fees in the United States. It will then
consider the broader spectrum of policies behind fee shifting. Fee
shifting may, after all, advance policies undesirable in the forfeiture
context. In addition to the "promotion of justice through reparation
of the damaged party" and "access to justice" arguments, this Com-
ment will discuss the policies of "punishment of abuses" and "private
enforcement of justice. '"" 9 Finally, this Part will attempt to predict
some of the effects a fee shift may have in the forfeiture context. Such
a prediction is difficult because of the numerous variables involved.
The discussion of effects of a fee shift will therefore be limited to two
typical situations, for which a prediction is sensible and frequently
accurate: suits by litigants of modest means and harassment suits. 20
The discussion of the two situations is appropriate in this Comment
because forfeiture actions are often perceived to fall into these two
117. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
118. As of 1983, more than 150 federal fee-shifting provisions existed. Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 363 U.S. 680, 684 (1983). For a list of examples of such statutes, see Bruce Fein,
Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical Examination of Government-
"Subsidized" Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, n.6 (1984). In addition, states
have almost 2,000 fee-shifting statutes or provisions on their books. For an in-depth study of
states' fee-shifting statutes as of 1983, see Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We
Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 329 (1984).
119. Frances Kahn Zemans, of the American Jurisprudence Society, and Professor Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., of Duke University, define these policies as the main reasons for attorney fee
shifting. This section of the discussion relies to some degree on the parameters defined by
Zemans in Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
187 (1984), and by Professor Rowe in The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
120. Note that a harassment suit for purposes of this Comment refers to a rational, though
unethical, attempt to maximize financial gain through the legal process. For the purpose of
this discussion, a harassment suit is not a suit brought with the malicious intent to annoy the
other party.
1992]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:147
categories. Many forfeiture litigants are poor;121 additionally, the
government at times seems to pursue suits against the property of
owners purely in the hope of a lucrative settlement, 122 a practice here
termed "harassment suit."
A. The History of Attorney Fees in the United States
In colonial America, accepted practice was the English rule-a
two-way fee shift whereby the loser of a lawsuit paid the winner's
expenses. 123 Statutes limited the amounts recoverable from the oppo-
nent.1 24  Courts administered fees collected from opponents and
afforded the individual attorney relatively little opportunity to evade
these regulations. 125 Attorneys were thus effectively restrained from
charging their clients what the market would bear. With the rise of
capitalism and the free market economy, pressure grew to adjust the
system. 126 State courts began to support lawyers who charged their
own clients market rates in circumvention of the statutory provi-
121. While there are no exact data on the average income of forfeiture claimants, it appears
that few claimants are high-level drug dealers. DEA's own data show that big-ticket items -
valued at more than $50,000 - comprised only 17% of the total 25,297 items seized by the
DEA from July 1989 to December 1990. PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 4.
122. Case law does not offer support for this assertion because the government usually
reaches its goal by settling cases profitably or simply loses on the merits, in which case it rarely
appeals. Ample evidence of this practice exists, however, in anecdotal press-reports, such as
the following passage:
In April 1989, deputies from Jefferson Davis Parish, Louisiana, seized
$23,000 from Johnny Sotello, a Mexican-American whose truck overheated on a
highway.
They offered help, he accepted. They asked to search his truck, he agreed.
They asked if he was carrying cash. He said he was because he was scouting
heavy equipment auctions.
They then pulled a door panel from the truck, said the space behind it could
have hidden drugs, and seized the money and the truck, court records show.
Police did not arrest Sotello but told him he would have to go to court to recover
his property.
Sotello sent auctioneer's receipts to police, which showed that he was a
licensed buyer. The sheriff offered to settle the case, and with his legal bills
mounting after two years, Sotello accepted. In a deal cut last March, he got his
truck but only half his money. The cops kept $11,500.
PRESUMED GUILTY, supra note 1, at 6.
123. One Virginia statute simply stated, "it is, unreasonable that the party who prevails...
should be subject to the payment of a greater fee to his lawyer than he can recover from the
adverse party." 1778 Va. Acts, ch. 14 § 5, reprinted in THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 84 (John D. Cushing comp. 1982). Not surprisingly, early Americans followed the
system their English ancestors had considered fair.
124. See 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
AMERICA 85-327 (1967); see also John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984).
125. Id. at 12.
126. Id. at 13-17.
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sions. 12 The first acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of the
newly developing practice came in the 1796 case of Acrambel v. Wise-
man. 28 The new American rule became the accepted and prevailing
mode for the payment of attorney fees during the second half of the
nineteenth century. 129 Yet, even as the rule reached its zenith, excep-
tions began to develop.1 30 Courts of the time almost always deferred
to the agreements of the contracting parties. They bent the new
American rule to grant prevailing parties recovery of attorney fees
from the opponent pursuant to contractual provisions entered into
before the dispute arose. 131
The statutes permitting recovery of attorney fees soon introduced
a new variation: one-way fee shifts that were neither the pure English
nor the pure American rule. 132  Under one-way shifts, successful
127. See, e.g. Lytle v. State, 17 Ark. 608 (1857). The unhappy attorneys of the time
demanded the power to contract freely with their clients for fees above and beyond those
specified in the statutes. By the 1830s, the courts began to recognize the discrepancies between
actual market rates and the statutory rates. See, e.g., Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts 334, 339 (Pa.
1835).
128. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 306 (1796). The Acrambel court not only gave attorneys permission to
set their own fees, but also denounced the English fee-shifting rule. The court stated that
"[the general practice of the United States is in opposition to [fee shifting]; and even if that
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is
changed, or modified, by statute." Id.
Modern cases cite Acrambel mostly for the proposition that the prevailing party under the
American rule cannot recover legal fees from the loser. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50 (1975). However, Acrambel may have been more
significant as an expression of the emancipation of the 19th century attorney. Following
Acrambel, for example, courts became more and more willing to enforce private fee contracts
between attorneys and their clients. See, e.g., Stevens & Cagger v. Adams, 23 Wend. 57 (N.Y.
1840), aff'd, 26 Wend. 451 (N.Y. 1841).
129. See Leubsdorf, supra note 124, at 17. Attorney fees, people commonly believed, were a
private matter beyond the reach of the government. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256-505 (1979).
130. The first exceptions to develop were statutes providing fee shifts in litigation brought
under the respective statute. A second exception developed concurrently or soon thereafter:
Fee shifts pursuant to contract. Consistent with their ideological commitment to "freedom of
contract," courts began to grant the recovery of attorney fees when the contract under which
the plaintiff sued provided for such a shift. See, e.g., Tallman v. Truesdell, 3 Wis. 393, 403
(1854).
131. See, e.g., Merchants' Nat'l. Bank v. Sevier, 14 F. 662, 667 (1882). Courts soon began
to apply this concept to forfeitures of property secured by liens. Parties frequently agreed in
their lien contracts that any legal fees arising out of disputes regarding the lien would be paid
by the loser. For example, in United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1890), the Supreme Court
reiterated the "relation back" or "taint" theory and found that the government's right to
property vested at the time of the act giving rise to the forfeiture. See supra notes 91-93 and
accompanying text. Yet, the government's right was subordinate to all superior rights existing
in the property at the time of violation, such as the attorney fee-shifting agreement between the
lien holder and the debtor. For the practical and potential effects this theory has on modern
forfeiture laws, see the discussion infra part IV.B.
132. The voting rights legislation of 1870, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the
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plaintiffs could recover fees while defendants could not. The one-way
shifting concept transformed attorney fee provisions from a simple
payment method into a tool for dispensing justice and equality.1 33
Legislation incorporating such one-way fee shifts to advance a stated
policy became common in the twentieth century.1 3 4  In 1975, the
United States Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wil-
derness Society,13 5 clarified attorney fee practice for modern litigation:
each party pays its own fees unless there is a specific contract or a
statutory provision to the contrary.
Lawyer emancipation, the driving force behind the American
rule in its early days, no longer plays a role. Today's lawyer has a
firm position in the free market. Modern fee-shifting provisions,
while frequently providing for payment of the loser's fees by the win-
ner, do not curtail the ability of the attorney to charge her own client.
The early legal profession's fear of being constrained by fee-shifting
statutes thus no longer militates against such legislation. On the other
hand, fee shifts today continue to play a role as tools of social justice.
As the following section will demonstrate, there are good arguments
that fee-shifting provisions promote access to justice and fairness in
the legal process. In summary, a review of the history of attorney fees
in the United States shows no valid reasons against fee-shifting legisla-
tion in general, but good reasons in favor of such laws.
B. Policy Considerations
Statutory fee-shifting provisions advance several public policies,
some of which affect the very problems faced by innocent owners in
Sherman Act of 1890 all incorporated provisions that permitted successful plaintiffs to recover
attorney fees in addition to other damages. See Leubsdorf, supra note 124, at 25.
133. The American rule thus evolved from a manifestation of lawyer emancipation to a tool
of social engineering. Id.
134. A comprehensive survey of state fee-shifting statutes found an "explosion" of
legislation incorporating fee-shifting provisions between 1961 and 1980. Of the approximately
2000 fee-shifting provisions on the books in the various states in 1982, only 5% were enacted
before 1900. See Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the
American Rule?, supra note 118, at 341.
The same holds true for federal statutes. Almost all major environmental statutes (e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 7607(0 (Clean Air Act)) and civil rights legislation (e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1982)
(school desegregation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(k) (1976) (employment discrimination)) were
enacted between 1961 and 1980. Many of them contained fee-shifting provisions. Courts
participated in the expansion of such statutes by interpreting them broadly. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Laws like the EqualAccess to Justice Act (Pub. L. No. 96-481,
94 Stat. 2321 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1991) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988)),
provided for one-way fee shifting for entire areas of litigation. Yet, in circumstances where
courts found no express statutory authority for a fee shift, they remained committed to the
American rule. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
135. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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forfeiture suits. This section will first discuss the policies that are
patently relevant in the civil forfeiture/innocent owner context and
will then consider other policies that could affect forfeiture laws in
more subtle ways. The section will thus move from the "promotion of
fairness" and concurrent "reparation of the damaged party" reason-
ing, via the "access to justice" argument, to the "punishment for
abuses" policy and later to the "private enforcement of justice"
argument.
1. PROMOTION OF FAIRNESS BY MAKING THE WINNER WHOLE
In defense of the American Rule, the Supreme Court explained
that "since litigation is at best uncertain one should not be penalized
for merely defending or prosecuting a law suit. ' 136 In other words,
because the courts dispense justice imperfectly, fairness is best served
if the parties can at least predict their potential liability for legal fees.
Proponents of fee-shifting agreements take a less cynical stance when
they assess the manner in which courts dispense justice. They seem to
assume that those who were wronged prevail in litigation. Because
two-way fee-shifting provisions award winners the expenses required
to vindicate their rights, those who were wronged are made whole. 137
Such provisions promote fairness because those who cause injury, or
those who cause hardship by bringing an unjust suit, must completely
restore the opponent to the status held before the injury or suit. One-
way fee shifts on the other hand, while making the designated party138
whole if she wins, will not protect the winning non-designated party.
One-way fee shifts favor one party over the other and thus do not
promote fairness in cases where opposing parties have roughly equal
resources and strength. However, for parties of grossly unequal
strength, this inherent bias in one-way fee shifts can promote fairness
by levelling the playing field. This occurs in disputes between the gov-
ernment and a private party (for instance in civil forfeiture proceed-
ings). Under such circumstances, a one-way "pro-prevailing private
party" fee shift would give the private party the assurance that an
impartial proceeding can fully vindicate her rights. In contrast, the
136. Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). As one
commentator stated: "The American rule assumes that, given the uncertainties of litigation, it
is unfair to penalize the loser with the payment of the winner's fees. The English rule assumes
that it is unfair to force one who wins a law suit to pay for the needless expense occasioned by
the loser's erroneous contest of the winner's position. The winner should be made whole."
Murray L. Schwartz, Attorney Fee Shifting, Foreword, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2
(1984).
137. With a one-way, pro-plaintiff shift, that axiom holds true only if the plaintiff wins. If
the defendant wins, the plaintiff remains in the same situation as under the American rule.
138. "Designated" refers to one-way, pro-plaintiff or one-way, pro-defendant shifts.
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American rule will cause the prevailing litigant, who is always respon-
sible for her attorney fees, a net loss. Again, civil forfeiture is a good
example. A claimant's satisfaction of victory is always soured by the
loss of legal fees incurred to secure the victory. In sum, fee-shifting
provisions make prevailing or designated parties whole, while the
American rule does not. Arguably, these provisions promote fairness
more effectively than the pure American rule does.
2. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Inherent in the American legal system is the notion that parties
should have their rights vindicated regardless of their economic sta-
tus. Yet the costs of legal representation can thwart meritorious
claims in cases where these costs outweigh the expected recovery or
where the litigant simply cannot afford them. 39  Additionally,
because of the slim chance of ever getting paid, attorneys are often
unwilling to represent poor clients. The American rule thus deters
poor litigants from bringing potentially meritorious cases and attor-
neys from accepting such cases. One can easily imagine a forfeiture
scenario where an innocent owner loses her residence, in which she
has only minimal equity, after an acquaintance stores small amounts
of drugs on the premises. She will be hard-pressed to spend more
than the equity she holds in her home on legal fees to assert her inno-
cent ownership claim. Moreover, few attorneys would take her case
knowing that, even if she prevails, the equity in her homestead cannot
cover her legal expenses. The prospect of a one-way, pro-claimant fee
shift would change this scenario. 40 A poor client with a strong claim
could stage a defense costing more than the net worth of the res, bal-
ancing the reasonable hope of recovering attorney fees against the risk
of having to pay no more than her own attorney fees. A two-way fee-
shifting provision, however, pits the hope for full recovery against the
risk of possibly having to pay the opponent's fee as well. Depending
upon the litigant's evaluation of these two competing factors, a two-
way shifting provision may or may not improve access to justice.
Attorneys, in contrast, should be more willing to provide legal
139. According to one commentator, "by discouraging the poor from taking legal action
the American rule has the effect of actually encouraging violations of their rights." Zemans,
supra note 119, at 189. Note that the emergence of contingency fees as a variation of the pure
American rule provided the poor with the means to hire legal representation-at the cost of
full recovery.
140. For clients with low risk aversity, or for clients who believe they have strong cases,
even a two-way fee shift is an improvement over the pure American rule. Yet, as discussed
infra note 165, those litigants who need easier access to justice, namely poor litigants, often
have high risk aversity and accordingly would profit little from a two-way fee-shifting
provision.
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services in both one-way and two-way shifting scenarios. Under one-
way shifting, two-way shifting, or the pure American rule, attorneys
risk no more than the value of their services. 4 ' On the other hand,
the prospect for full payment improves with both one-way and two-
way provisions. For the attorney pondering whether or not to under-
take a civil forfeiture defense, the availability of any fee shift may
make the difference. Considering both clients' and their attorneys'
motivations, it is safe to say that one-way fee shifting will improve
access to justice for claimants. Compared to the American "no-shift"
rule, two-way shifting will increase the willingness of attorneys to
accept forfeiture cases, but possibly decrease the willingness of risk
averse clients to bring cases.' 42
3. PUNISHMENT FOR ABUSES
One of the earliest justifications for fee shifting was to punish the
filing of frivolous or bad faith suits. 143 When American courts first
began to grant exceptions to the American rule, they justified fee
shifting as a punitive measure to ensure the integrity of the judicial
process.' 44 Trial courts were given great latitude to assess legal fees
against parties who acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons. 14 The imposition of attorney fees as punishment
141. A two-way shifting provision creates slightly higher risk. The client may run out of
money before paying both his and his opponent's attorney. For attorneys balancing that
heightened risk of non-payment against the expectation of full payment after a fee shift, the
equation remains virtually unchanged. For them, an estimation of case-strength may
ultimately decide whether or not to represent the client. In forfeiture cases, innocent
ownership claims can be very strong, such as the landlord's claim against the property used for
drug-dealing by a renter. Thus, in strong forfeiture cases, a two-way shift could entice
attorneys to defend property owners.
142. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
143. In the early classical period of Roman law, the principle of lis crescens in duplum
forced a party who denied a debt to pay twice the amount claimed by the other party if that
other party prevailed in court. This two-fold increase, called poena temere litigatium,
constituted a penalty for litigating in bad faith. The court presumed bad faith on the part of
the losing party. LEOPOLD WENGER, INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 130-31 (Otis Harrison, trans. 1940). The idea that guilty parties who go to court
to dispute their responsibility should be punished for their litigiousness alone still persists
today. As one commentator said:
If both parties are so stubborn as to waste resources disputing a small liability,
society's interest will better be served by making the defendant who wronged his
neighbor and then refused to recompense him pay the resulting legal expenses
than by letting his recalcitrance immunize him from paying what he owes.
John Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 439, 451 (1986).
144. See, e.g., Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) (finding fee award justifiable
only as punishment).
145. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
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taught the punished litigant how to behave in court in the future' 46
and also served as a general deterrent to future litigants' misbehavior.
The effect of fee shifting as punishment is insignificant in the for-
feiture context. It makes no sense to think of a fee shift as punish-
ment if the affected agency strictly followed current laws but was
trumped by the claim of an innocent owner. Any imaginable punitive
effect would merely act as general deterrence, affecting only the gov-
ernment's general forfeiture policy.
The additional purpose of teaching the wrongdoer a lesson plays
no role in forfeiture cases, either. The losing agency would not need a
lesson if it followed existing law. Moreover, even if an overzealous
agent deserved punishment, a court could not realistically assess fees
against the individual agency employee who forced the innocent
owner to go to court. A fee shift would be directed against an agency
or a department as a whole. Hence, the pedagogical value of the shift
would be minimal.
On the whole, a fee-shifting provision in the current forfeiture
laws would not significantly advance the policy of punishing a party.
Given the current mood of legislature and judiciary in favor of tough
government action on the forfeiture front, 47 lawmakers hardly want
to "punish" agencies who press forfeiture laws to the limits. To the
contrary, the absence of a punitive purpose or rationale make the pro-
posed fee-shifting provisions more palatable for those favoring the
current forfeiture laws.
4. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF JUSTICE
Private actions based on statutory provisions serve a purpose
beyond the vindication of a litigant's rights. 4  These actions effectu-
ate the policy intent of the legislature. 49 As such, private actions are
useful to advance the goals of the legislature and thus, by implication,
society as a whole.'10 Because a fee shift can encourage a private
146. See generally Johannes Andenaes, The 'General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966).
147. See supra part II.F.
148. "Laws are to a substantial extent effectuated through the demands of their
beneficiaries." Zemans, supra note 119, at 194.
149. "That is to say, whenever a legislative body passes a law, it does so for public policy
purposes. Therefore, there is always a public argument to be made for encouraging its
enforcement. The desirability of such enforcement is basically a political decision." Id. at 197.
150. See Jon S. Hoak, Note, Attorney Fees: Exceptions to the American Rule, 25 DRAKE L.
REV. 717, 723 (1976). In contrast to one-way fee shifting, the American rule does not
encourage enforcement of statutes by private action. After all, a litigant who can expect to pay
her own litigation expenses has little incentive to act as quasi-governmental enforcer of
legislation for the common good. In recognition of that fact, commentators have called the
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party to bring actions based on statutory provisions, the shift directly
or indirectly advances legislative policy. A typical example is the
"citizen suit," a statutorily created cause of action brought by private
individuals or groups against federal agencies. A citizen suit usually
challenges proposed or actual implementation of an administrative
policy based on inconsistency with authorizing legislation. 5 I Typi-
cally, citizen-suit statutes seek to promote litigation in areas the gov-
ernment wishes to regulate but where it does not have the supervisory
manpower or resources to do so.' 52 By offering to pay a citizen's
attorney fees after a successful suit against an agency, the federal gov-
ernment taps the resource of the "private attorney general" to super-
vise its agencies.
The policy of private enforcement of justice is not a factor in
connection with a fee shift in civil forfeitures. The shifts proposed in
Part V of this Comment neither advance nor frustrate the legislature's
announced intent for civil forfeiture laws. The legislative policy
imbued into the forfeiture laws is to deprive the drug trade of its eco-
nomic power by effectively siphoning off profits. 153 The availability of
a fee shift for innocent owners will not affect the efficiency of the cur-
rent forfeiture laws.' 54 Furthermore, the claim of an innocent owner
hardly constitutes a "citizen suit." Such a claim does not challenge
administrative policy inconsistent with authorizing legislation, but
American rule "indefensible" on enforcement grounds for all statutory law. See Zemans, supra
note 119, at 197.
151. Fein, supra note 118, at 212. Most statutory fee-shifting provisions resemble the
following subsection of the Clean Air Act: "in any judicial proceeding under this section, the
court may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)
whenever it determines that such award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (1992).
152. One example is the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0(1992). While the government
wants to advance the policy of preserving air quality, it simply cannot fiela an army of
inspectors to control potential malefactors. Congress recognized this dilemma in its comment
to the Surface Mining and Regulation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp. V. 1981). There,
Congress acknowledged that
[t]he success or failure of a national coal surface mining regulation program will
depend, to a significant extent, on the role played by citizens in the regulatory
process .... [P]roviding citizens access to administrative appellate procedures
and the courts is a practical and legitimate method of assuring the regulatory
authority's compliance with the requirements of the act."
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 88-89, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 625.
153. See Legislative History to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
154. To the contrary, a one-way pro-claimant fee shift may, in the long run, improve the
efficiency of the forfeiture laws. By encouraging the government to investigate the rights of the
innocent owner carefully before instituting a forfeiture action, a fee-shifting provision might
reduce cases resulting in return of the property to the innocent owner. As a result, the
government would spend less time and money pursuing fruitless cases, which would render its
forfeiture efforts in meritorious cases more effective.
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rather attacks the application of existing legislation to particular cir-
cumstances. Because a fee shift would not seriously affect the policy
of private enforcement of justice, that policy will not be further con-
sidered in the discussion of existing and proposed fee-shifting provi-
sions for civil forfeiture laws.
C. The Effects of Fee Shifting
A cost-benefit analysis of a given fee-shifting provision must con-
sider not only the policies to be furthered by the provision, but also
the anticipated economic effects of the measure.1 55 Economists, who
only recently began to analyze such effects, 156 are confronted by
numerous, unwieldy factors. First, the effects of two-way fee shifts
radically differ from the effects of one-way shifts. In addition, all fee-
shifting systems are subject to one or more of the following structural
variables: the breadth of applicability of the scheme, the legal stan-
dard for awarding fees, the effect of "offer of judgment" devices on fee
liability,157 and the method for calculating the fees. For each permu-
tation of these factors, the effects of the fee shift further depend on
"situation factors," such as the parties' perception of the strength of
the case,15 the character of the litigants,159 the relation between the
155. One of the foremost scholars on the issue of attorney fees, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
complained about the lack of sophistication in the discussion surrounding fee shifting. In
particular, Rowe bemoaned the overgeneralization pervading the literature on attorney fee
shifting and the failure of many commentators to take into account the effects of fee rules on
both sides. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects ofAttorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 144 (1984).
This section will rely on the parameters set out by Professor Rowe for the discussion of
potential effects of fee shifts. Id. at 140-43.
156. See generally Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under
Alternative Methodsfor the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
157. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits defendants to make formal
settlement offers during litigation. If the plaintiff rejects the offer and later recovers less than
the offered amount, the plaintiff may not collect her own costs and additionally must pay the
defendant's fees and costs incurred after the offer. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985).
158. This factor is particularly significant in predicting when parties will settle. Normally,
the specter of unreimbursed attorney fees can bridge the gap between the parties' relative
estimate of their cases' strength and thus encourage them to settle. However, "if a fee-shifting
rule applies, expectations about the outcome will influence whether a party foresees little
chance of reimbursement.., or anticipates recovery of costs as well as success on the merits,
reducing any gap-bridging effect." Rowe, supra note 155, at 143.
159. The character of "repeat players" is generally distinguishable from that of "one-
shotters" in litigation. Usually, repeat players are risk neutral, which means that the risk of
losing does not deter them from litigation. One-shotters, on the other hand, are risk averse, or
very much concerned about losing the particular case. The risk-preference of a given party
greatly influences whether the party will pursue a claim or defense and under what
circumstances a party will settle. Thus, the effects of a given fee-shifting scheme will greatly
[Vol. 47:147
CIVIL FORFEITURE
costs and the stakes in the litigation,160 and the estimates by the par-
ties of their opponent's eventual legal bill. It is not surprising that
comprehensive expositions of the effects of fee shifting are incredibly
intricate.1 61 Yet, predictions about the effects of fee shifting are possi-
ble and fruitful for certain typical, but isolated settings. 162 With an
eye toward application in the forfeiture context, two situations will be
considered: harassment suits and suits by litigants with modest
means. 163
1. SUITS BY LITIGANTS WITH MODEST MEANS
1 64
Litigants of modest means are strongly averse to risk-taking. 165
depend on the objectives of the individual litigants. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV.
95 (1974).
160. The higher the projected fees are in relation to the amount at stake, the greeter will be
the influence of fee concerns. Litigation costs do not usually increase proportionally to the
increase in the stakes. Therefore, the relative importance of attorney fees is generally greater
in small cases than in high-stake cases. See Matthew B. Wills & Neil Gold, Attorneys' Fees
Litigation: Time to Discard the American Rule?, LITIGATION, Spring 1978, at 31. Fee-shifting
agreements will thus influence small-claim parties to a greater degree than large-scale litigants.
161. Readers who enjoy "intricate" may want to consult Ronald Braeutigam et al., An
Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173
(1984); John J. Donohue III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate: Theoretical
Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195
(1991); John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't
Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991).
162. An example of a predictable effect of fee shifting is that a one-way shift in favor of the
prevailing plaintiff will encourage the pursuit of claims under virtually all circumstances. See
Rowe, supra note 155, at 147. Because such a fee shift invariably rewards plaintiffs for a
successful suit without simultaneously increasing the risk, it naturally works as an incentive
for a plaintiff to stake a claim. See Shavell, supra note 156, at 55. However, it remains unclear
how strongly that incentive varies among distinct litigants. Moreover, the prospect of fee
shifting may affect not only the willingness of a litigant to sue, but also the eagerness of an
attorney to accept a case. One must therefore consider the influence of a shift on the lawyer as
well as on a litigant when predicting potential effects of the shift.
163. As explained in the introduction to this part, it makes sense to study these two cases in
the forfeiture context because numerous claimants in forfeiture actions are poor and because
the government occasionally appears to forfeit property of arguably innocent owners in the
hope of reaching a favorable settlement-a practice termed here "harassment suit."
164. The observed effects of fee shifting on litigants of modest means hold true for most
middle-income litigants as well. In fact, almost any private litigant who pays her own legal
fees falls into this same category. This Comment uses the terms "poor litigant" and "litigant
of modest means" interchangeably.
165. Under a general economic analysis of risk, the standard assumption is "that the higher
a person's wealth, the less averse he is to a given size risk." A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 52 n.31 (1983). See Robert D. Cooter & Edward
L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 71 (1987)
(noting that "[m]ost decision makers are risk neutral toward losses that are small in proportion
to their wealth, and risk averse toward losses that are relatively large."); Louis Kaplow, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Transactions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 596 (1986) (explaining that
"risk aversion tends to decline as wealth increases, less wealthy individuals tend to give greater
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For litigants of modest means, the prospect of having to pay the oppo-
nent's fees outweighs the prospect of being compensated for their
expenditures. Under the American rule, the poor litigant neither has
the chance of being compensated for fees nor the risk of having to pay
the opponent's fees. Rational litigants of modest means should thus
prefer the American rule over a two-way fee shift because the deter-
rent effect of a two-way fee shift outweighs incentives to litigate.166
Because of poor litigants' heightened risk aversity, a two-way fee shift
tends to deter them from even raising a meritorious claim. 6 7 How-
ever, the most promising prospect for the poor litigant is a one-way
fee shift in his favor. Such a litigant could expect reimbursement for
the considerable percentage of his resources spent in pursuit of the
claim. If unsuccessful, his only expense would be his own attorney's
fee and costs.' 6 The majority of fee-shifting provisions in force today
fall into the one-way, pro-plaintiff category.' 69
weight to the risk imposed by uncertainty concerning future government policy than do more
wealthy individuals"); see also Erin A. O'Hara, Note, Hedonic Damages for Wrongful Death:
Are Tortfeasorsgetting Away With Murder? 78 GEO. L.J. 1687, 1715 (1990) (noting that "there
are at least some instances in which poor individuals tend to be more risk averse than wealthy
individuals.").
In the area of attorney fees, "[t]he mechanism is simply that, given risk aversion and
diminishing marginal utility of income and wealth, the threat of having to pay the other side's
fee can loom so large in the mind of a person without considerable disposable assets that it
deters the pursuit of even a fairly promising and substantial claim or defense." Rowe, supra
note 146, at 153. In other words, the risk of having to pay the opponent's fees usually looms
larger for the impecunious plaintiff than the prospect of being compensated for his fee expense,
because legal fees constitute a larger percentage of a poor person's disposable income. Risk
aversity thus is an inverse function of a litigant's economic status. Of course, plaintiffs who are
so poor that the threat of personal bankruptcy is meaningless to them should be subject to
entirely different rules.
166. The U.S. Supreme Court framed that proposition in the following terms:
In support of the American rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions
to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponents' counsel.
Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
167. Two-way fee-shifting provisions most strongly deter reasonable, but not clearly
meritorious, claims of plaintiffs who are on the lower rungs of the economic ladder. Robin C.
White, Contingent Fees: A Supplement to Legal Aid?, 41 MOD. L. REV. 286, 295 (1978); see
generally BARLOW CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970).
The availability of a fee shift also affects the poor litigant's ability to secure legal
representation. See discussion supra part III.B.2. Unless a fee shift attracts a hungry attorney,
poor plaintiffs will hardly find representation to assert their claim. See Zemans, supra note
119, at 189.
168. A reminder of early colonial practice is that courts routinely impose "costs" on the
losing party under the American rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
169. Of 1,974 fee-shifting provisions in force on the state level in 1982, 1073 (54.4%) were
of the "prevailing plaintiff" kind. "Prevailing party" schemes (the English rule) finished a
distant second with 383 statutes (19.4%), and "prevailing defendant" provisions came in third
CIVIL FORFEITURE
In a civil forfeiture context, poor claimants will profit from a
one-way fee-shifting provision in their favor, but probably not from
any other type. Even the current system, under which the parties pay
their own fees, should be preferable over a potential two-way shifting
provision for a risk averse, poor claimant.
2. HARASSMENT SUITS
A common, but nevertheless despicable outgrowth of the Ameri-
can legal system is the harassment suit. In harassment litigation, a
plaintiff files a suit without any real chance for success, but in the
hope that the opposing party will settle out-of-court because defense
costs would be higher than an acceptable settlement.170 Under the
American system, a litigant can always pursue a suit in the hope of
winning, or at the very least of vexing the opponent with burdensome
discovery.'7 1 Even if the plaintiff expects to gain little at trial, the suit
may nevertheless be rational given the prospect of a favorable settle-
ment. 72 If the defendant stands firm, the plaintiff can jump ship via
voluntary dismissal at little cost.173
Commentators justifiedly argue that fee shifting discourages har-
with 165 statutes (8.4%). "Aggrieved party", "either party", "moving party", "specific
prevailing party", "defendant", "plaintiff", "prevailing appellee", "prevailing appellant", and
"other" also ran and finished, in that order. See Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes:
Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, supra note 118, at 330.
170. See, e.g., Larry Bodine, Losers Get Legal Tab in Florida, NAT'L L.J., July 7, 1980, at 1.
Apparently, certain civil forfeiture actions by the government have reaching a profitable
settlement as their only goal. See, e.g., the Billy Munnerlyn case, supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 122.
171. See supra notes 1-6. In Billy Munnerlyn's case, the government seems to have known
early on in the proceedings that it could not secure a forfeiture against him. It appears that the
government used its possession of Munnerlyn's plane as leverage to secure a favorable
settlement at a time when he could no longer afford to pay his attorney fees.
172. I.P.L. P'ng, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial, 14 BELL J. EcON. 539,
548 (1983).
173. Under the American rule, a plaintiff's only expense at this early stage is her attorney
fees. The defendant may commence discovery before the plaintiff, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b),
and so usually accrues high attorney fees earlier than the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff can let
the defendant incur expenses while she does nothing. If the defendant has not settled when the
plaintiff's time comes to respond and to conduct her own discovery, she can voluntarily
dismiss the case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), which governs voluntary dismissal,
does not expressly provide for sanctions in connection with such dismissals.
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assment litigation. 174 A fee-shifting sanction 75 forces the plaintiff to
balance the risk of paying an opponent's legal fees against the benefit
to be gained from harassing the opponent. A one-way, pro-defendant
provision strongly deters nuisance plaintiffs because it increases the
risk of suing without significantly increasing the prospect for recov-
ery."16 Under two-way shifting, the risks of suing increase along with
the prospects for recovery. However, the risks of suing tend to out-
weigh the increased recovery prospects in the usual, weak harassment
suit. In the typical harassment suit, the increased recovery prospect
under a two-way shift is purely theoretical while the corresponding
higher risk is very real. Two-way (and one-way, pro-defendant) fee-
shifting provisions therefore effectively deter harassment suits.
In forfeiture actions instituted by the government in the hope of
a favorable settlement, one-way, pro-defendant (i.e. pro-claimant) fee
shifts, as well as two-way shifts, could thus make a difference. If the
government must calculate the opponent's attorney fees in its cost
equation, unfounded suits become unprofitable. The government
would no longer pursue borderline cases in order to maximize profits.
IV. FEE AWARD REMEDIES AVAILABLE TODAY TO CLAIMANTS
IN FORFEITURE SUITS
The current forfeiture statute does not provide attorney fees for
claimants who prevail on an innocent owner defense."17 There are,
174. See, e.g., Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49
IOWA L. REV. 75, 78 (1963).
If a party abusing the system is made to pay the actual expense of the injury
caused, it is to his financial advantage not to abuse the system. The possibility of
having to pay a lawyer's fee for both sides of the litigation would make a plaintiff
think twice before he files a petition.
Id. at 80.
175. The current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for fee shifting as a sanction
under limited circumstances. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 provides that if a party
interposes a pleading or motion to harass an opponent, the signing attorney may have "to pay
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading ... including a reasonable attorney's fee." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The Supreme
Court used a similar rationale when it sanctioned the imposition of fees against frivolous
complaints in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (finding that a
fee award to the defendant in a civil rights action is appropriate if the plaintiff's action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or brought in bad faith).
176. A one-way, pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provision cannot discourage harassment suits. On
the contrary, because the theoretically improved recovery prospects under the one-way, pro-
plaintiff shift are not offset by an increased risk of having to pay the opponent's fees, such
provisions are, if anything, an incentive for harassment.
177. See supra note 7. See also United States v. Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F.2d 798
(1 th Cir. 1991). Current federal regulations for forfeiture proceedings reject the idea that the
"net equity" in a piece of property being returned to an owner after a finding of innocent
ownership includes an entitlement to attorney fees. See 28 C.F.R. 9.2(h) (1992). One federal
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however, two fee-shifting mechanisms in place today under which an
innocent owner may sometimes recover attorney fees from the gov-
ernment. First, the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA")178 pro-
vides attorney fee compensation for defendants in government-
instigated lawsuits after a finding that the government's case was not
"substantially justified."'' 79 Second, many courts have found that by
seizing and forfeiting property, the government assumes all rights and
obligations encumbering the property at the time of the violation.18 0
Therefore, where a creditor has a pre-violation lien on the owner's
property, with a provision that the debtor must pay the litigation
expenses caused by the debtor, the government assumes that obliga-
tion when it receives the property. 8 '1 The two methods of fee recov-
ery offer an interesting juxtaposition of two basic governmental roles:
the EAJA holds the government liable in its capacity as govern-
ment, 18 2 while the contractual method binds the government because
is has assumed the obligations of a private party.18 3 Moreover, the
district court explained that "the 'interest' of an innocent owner under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) is
the amount allowed by the government under its administrative practice for remissions. The
applicable section, 28 C.F.R. § 9.1(h)[sic], explicitly disallows recovery for attorney's fees
.." United States v. Gulfstream West, 710 F.Supp. 792, 796 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
178. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1991); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter EAJA].
179. The Act reads in part:
§ 504. COSTS AND FEES OF PARTIES
(a)(1) An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a
prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred
by that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer
of the agency finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified or
that special circumstances make an award unjust. Whether or not the position of
the agency was substantially justified shall be determined on the basis of the
administrative record, as a whole, which is made in the adversary adjudication
for which fees and other expenses are sought. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1991).
§ 2412. COSTS AND FEES
(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses,
in addition to any costs awarded.., incurred by that party in any civil action...
unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust ....
(d)(2)(C) "United States" includes any agency and any official of the United
States acting in his or her official capacity.
28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. 1990).
180. See supra part III.E.
181. See, e.g., Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F. 2d 798, 799 (11th Cir. 1991); cf United
States v. One Piece of Real Estate, 571 F. Supp. 723, 726 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (rejecting
"preexisting obligation" theory).
182. The theory is that the government should represent its citizens, and any damage
incurred by the citizens at the hands of the government should be borne by the government
itself.
183. While the fiction of the government standing in the shoes of a private party has a
populist ring to it, reality is that the government does not work under the same strictures as a
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
EAJA applies to shortcomings in the government's initial showing of
probable cause, while the contractual recovery method only takes
effect after the lienholder has established its defense of innocent
ownership.
In the end, neither recovery method helps the average innocent
owner. Because of their limited scope,"8 4 these mechanisms fail to
protect adequately the innocent owner from becoming a casualty of
the war on drugs. Nevertheless, they merit discussion because they
show that limited fee shifting already has a place in forfeiture law.
These methods can also serve as models for more effective provisions.
A. The Equal Access to Justice Act
The Equal Access to Justice Act permits prevailing private par-
ties"' in civil actions against the United States to recover attorney
fees and costs as part of their damages if the court finds that the
United States' position in the litigation was not substantially justified.
The EAJA, in force in its current version since 1985,186 was created,
in part, to diminish the deterrent effect of looming legal expenses on a
party contesting government action.1"7 Members of Congress
acknowledged that persons or entities with limited financial resources
frequently cannot bring meritorious cases against administrative agen-
cies because they lack the financial resources to compete with the
agency.1"8 In simple terms, a mechanism to reimburse private parties
private party. While the government may not appreciate having to take the position of its
predecessor in contract, the burden of having to compensate the innocent owner for litigation
expenses weighs far heavier upon a private party than on the government.
184. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text; see discussion infra part IV.B.
185. The EAJA defines an eligible party as:
(b)(l)(B)(i) [Ain individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the
time the adversary adjudication was initiated, or (ii) any owner of an
unincorporated business, or any partnership, corporation, association, unit of
local government or organization, the net worth of which did not exceed
$7,000,000 at the time the adversary adjudication was initiated.
5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. 1991).
186. Congress first enacted the EAJA in 1981. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. 2412 (1982)) (repealed
1984). Because of a three-year sunset provision, the EAJA was automatically repealed in
1984. Id. at 2329. In October, 1984, Congress passed a modified version of the Act to replace
the repealed version, but a presidential veto prevented it from taking effect. See H.R.Rep. No.
120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 134. After reconsideration,
Congress re-enacted the EAJA with presidential approval on August 5, 1985. See EAJA,
Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504)
(Supp. IV 1986) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Supp. III 1985)).
187. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984.
188. Id. at 4985; see also Hearings, supra note 13.
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for litigation expenses incurred because of misdirected government
action may level the playing field between the parties.
Beyond the purpose suggested by the EAJA's title, namely pro-
viding equal access to justice for private litigants, Congress envisioned
the Act as a tool to enable courts to channel and limit agency
power. 189 The EAJA thus furthers the policies customarily associated
with fee-shifting provisions.190 It increases the average citizen's
access to the courts, and it serves to make whole the litigant who
expended money to defend against unjustified government action.
Furthermore, the EAJA promotes private enforcement of justice by
encouraging private parties to sue runaway agencies. 191 The EAJA
also has a punitive component in that it makes agencies pay for
expenses caused by bad faith claims. 92
It might initially appear that innocent owners could effectively
use the EAJA to recover expenses caused by an unjustified' 93 forfei-
ture attempt by a governmental agency. Yet, the EAJA has proven
singularly ineffective in the civil forfeiture context. 194 The main rea-
189. As Senator Domenici said:
Since we can't get to these regulations, because they are so numerous and beyond
our capacity, it seemed to me that in the marketplace where citizens and
Government rub shoulders, that we should instil on the side of the citizen
another opportunity to combat and fight and resist not only so they can win, but
also to test whether or not the Government was being arbitrary.
Hearings, supra note 13, at 17-18. Lawmakers in the House of Representative specifically
intended the EAJA to have a regulatory effect on government agencies: "[The Act is] an
instrument for curbing excessive regulation and the unreasonable exercise of Government
authority." H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4991. The regulatory effect of the EAJA is particularly strong where an individual agency is
found to have acted in bad faith. Generally, fees awarded to prevailing parties against an
agency are paid through the General Accounting Office as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2414
(state/foreign decisions) and § 2517 (Court of Claims decisions). However, "if the basis for
the award is that the United States acted in bad faith, then the award shall be paid by any
agency found to have acted in bad faith and shall be in addition to any relief provided in the
judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (Supp. 1990). With this provision, at least the individual
agency responsible for the litigant's fees is made to pay.
190. See supra part III.C.
191. See supra note 189.
192. See supra note 189.
193. Although the failure of the government to achieve forfeiture appears to be evidence
that its forfeiture attempt was not justified, courts have so far rejected such an argument. See
United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1988).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property, 970 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying
EAJA fee award because the government was substantially justified and because the fee
application was premature); United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, 914 F.2d 804 (8th
Cir. 1990) (reversing recovery of attorney fees for a successful claimant in civil forfeiture
action under the EAJA even though the government's amended complaint was dismissed);
United States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 838 F.2d 1558 (1 th Cir. 1988) (rejecting EAJA fee
award to claimant in civil forfeiture action where the government strictly abided by the
statutory procedure when attempting forfeiture); cf United States v. Estridge, 797 F.2d 1454,
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son for this failure is the Act's limitation to government action that
was not "substantially justified."' 95 The "substantially justified" stan-
dard, "'96 found at the heart of most controversy regarding the EAJA,
poses particular problems in the civil forfeiture context. First, sub-
stantial justification of the government's decision to initiate and pur-
sue forfeiture proceedings must be examined in light of its burden
under the appropriate statute.197 In forfeiture actions, the govern-
ment must show no more than probable cause 98 to make a case. Fur-
thermore, under current law, if the government fails to succeed in its
forfeiture attempt, there is no presumption that the government's
position was not substantially justified.' 99 If the record reveals that
the government had a reasonable likelihood of prevailing in the
action, the claimant has no claim for attorney fees under the
EAJA.2 °° Under existing civil forfeiture law, the government has a
reasonable likelihood of prevailing in virtually all cases. 201 Therefore,
the EAJA very rarely applies in civil forfeiture cases.20 2
Secondly, the civil forfeiture action is an in rem proceeding.2 "3
1460 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming EAJA fee awards where the government brought civil action
without conducting a reasonable investigation into underlying facts).
195. See supra note 179.
196. Not surprisingly, the term "substantially justified" is not clearly defined. The term
depends on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. See 5 U.S.C. 504 (a)(1) cl. 2,
supra note 170. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that "substantially justified"
is an abstract term. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988). In Underwood,
Justice Scalia defined "substantially justified" as "justified in substance or in the main," or
"justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person." Id. at 553. With that issue
ilucidated, the Court found that a "reasonable basis both in law and fact" satisfies the
government's burden of proof in defending against attorney fee claims under the EAJA. Id.
For an in-depth discussion of the court's definition of the "substantially justified standard" in
Underwood, see Sharon G. Cheney and Cecilia S. Howard, Note, Pierce v. Underwood: Equal
Access to Justice Act -Standards Defined by the High Court, 40 MERCER L. REv. 1001 (1989).
197. United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1985).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
199. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d at 124.
200. Id.
201. Yet, at least one court acknowledged that "potentially unjustified forfeiture actions
should be subject to particular scrutiny because ... [florfeitures are not favored in the law;
strict compliance with the letter of the law by those seeking forfeiture must be required." United
States v. 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 838 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. $38,000 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1547 (11th Cir. 1987)) (other citations
omitted). The court, however, proceeded to reverse the award of attorney fees under the
EAJA. Id.
202. See, e.g., United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, 914 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1990)
(reversing fee award in unsuccessful action to forfeit sportscar); United States v. 4880 S.E.
Dixie Highway, 838 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1988) (vacating fee award in favor of innocent
owners of resort, restaurant, and boat company). But see United States v. Eighty-Eight (88)
Designated Accounts, 786 F.Supp. 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (affirming EAJA fee award where the
government had no probable cause to seize $94,765.12 of the $108,416.12 actually seized).
203. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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The United States, as plaintiff, brings the suit against a certain piece
of real or personal property as defendant. In many cases, that piece of
property is "guilty" under the forfeiture statute because it facilitated
the drug trade. At the same time, frequently the owner knew nothing
about the drug activity and so is "innocent." Once the government
makes its initial showing of probable cause that drugs tainted the
piece of property, the claimant can hardly argue that the govern-
ment's action against the res was not "substantially justified."2 "4 The
EAJA thus provides remedies only for claimants who can actually
rebut the government's initial showing of probable cause as to the
res.20 5 When innocent owners assert their defense, after the govern-
ment has made its probable cause showing, they cannot, even if suc-
cessful, claim that the government's actions were not substantially
justified. The innocent owner may be entitled to have her property
returned, but the government is entitled to be spared the EAJA
sanction.
B. Contractual Agreements for Attorney Fees
In a few, exceptional cases, the general rule that the government
is not liable for the innocent owner's attorney fees does not apply.
Such exceptions are founded on a premise first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Stowell.207 In Stowell, the Court
held that through forfeiture the government may succeed to no
greater interest in the property than that which belonged to the owner
at the time of the illegal act.20 8 Thus, if the government seizes prop-
erty encumbered by a mortgage, the government takes possession sub-
204. See United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir.1988) (finding the
district court's determination that the government's position lacked substantial justification
was incomprehensible where the district court had previously acknowledged that the
government had satisfied the initial evidentiary burden for a full-scale forfeiture trial).
205. Not surprisingly forfeiture proceedings ending in EAJA awards are few. If an EAJA
award of attorney fees survives a governmental appeal it is usually because the government has
brought a civil action without diligently investigating the underlying facts. United States v.
Estridge, 797 F.2d 1454, 1458 (8th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Eighty-Eight (88)
Designated Accounts, 786 F.Supp. 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1992). But see United States v. One Parcel
of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 208 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[I]n a forfeiture case, the fact that the
government's attempt at confiscation misfired will not raise a presumption that its position
lacked substantial justification.").
206. Courts so far have not distinguished between substantial justification as to the res and
substantial justification as to the owner. Such a distinction in the interpretation of the EAJA
could be the remedy sought in this Comment: because a finding of innocent ownership
logically implies that government action was not justified with respect to the owner, all
innocent owners would be compensated for their attorney fee expenses under the EAJA if
courts were to make such a distinction.
207. 133 U.S. 1 (1890); see also supra note 131 and accompanying text.
208. Title vests in the government at the moment the violation of the statute takes place.
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ject to the provisions of that encumbrance.2" Therefore, if the
mortgage contract includes a provision for the payment of attorney
fees and costs in litigation connected with the note, that provision also
binds the government.21 ° However, except in cases involving institu-
tional lenders or commercial landlords, few innocent owners have the
security net of a contract regulating attorney fees. Thus, fee shifts
based on contracts fail to provide an adequate remedy for most inno-
cent owners in forfeiture cases.
In summary, neither of the two existing provisions allowing for
attorney fee awards in forfeiture proceedings effectively protects inno-
cent owners. The following Part will discuss potential alternatives
and describe a more appropriate and inclusive fee-shifting provision
for the forfeiture context.
V. PROPOSED FEE-SHIFTING AMENDMENTS TO FORFEITURE
STATUTES
The main thrust of this Comment is to suggest a way to compen-
sate innocent owners for their expenses incurred in forfeiture battles.
The potential value of the fee-shifting schemes discussed below must
thus be gauged primarily by their potential to restore every owner
who proves her defense to the status she held before the seizure.
That, of course, implies an assurance of access to the courts for those
who claim innocence. Influencing the litigation behavior of the par-
ties is a secondary goal.211 In the end, one will see that the two pro-
Judicial condemnation serves only to formalize the transfer of ownership. Stowell, 133 U.S. at
16-17; see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
209. The plaintiff (claimant) in Stowell obtained a mortgage interest in the property before
any illegality occurred. Because the claimant concededly had no involvement in the illegality,
the Court held that "the mortgage is valid as against the United States, and . . . so far as
concerns the real estate, the judgment of condemnation must be against the equity of
redemption only." Stowell, 133 U.S. at 20. Modern courts apply this concept without
essential modification. See, e.g., In re Metmor Financial, Inc., 819 F.2d 446, 449 (4th Cir.
1987) (reversing lower court's holding that the government is not responsible for interest
payments on mortgages encumbering forfeited property); see also Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 579 n.7 (1935) ("[I]t is the general rule that a holder of the
equity of redemption [the government after forfeiture] can redeem from the mortgagee only on
paying the entire mortgage debt.").
210. United States v. Six Parcels of Real Property, 920 F.2d 798, 799 (1991).
211. Influencing the behavior of potential litigants serves as a prime purpose of fee-shifting
provisions in general. However, the two most common thrusts encompassed by this purpose,
punishing litigants for undesirable litigation behavior and encouraging private enforcement of
justice, are of secondary importance in the forfeiture context. Punishing for abuses: First,
given the popularity of the current forfeiture laws among politicians and the judiciary,
changes must relieve the innocent owners of their disproportionate burden and not "punish"
agencies. Second, any one governmental agency should not be singled out for "punishment" if
the agency proceeds within the parameters of established law. Third, if a governmental agency
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posed types of fee shifts are likely to produce disparate results. One
type will leave most innocent owners in the same sad shape they are
today, while the other type could be the antidote against overly bur-
densome forfeiture laws.
A. Elective Two- Way Shifting
1. THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
Two-way fee shifting, disfavored in the United States since the
late eighteenth century,21 2 has recently gained popularity. On Octo-
ber 23, 1991, as part of an effort by the executive branch to reform
civil justice, then-President Bush issued Executive Order No. 12778
("Executive Order").2 3 Concerned about the growth in civil litiga-
tion in American courts,21 4 the President made the order applicable to
all federal agencies involved in civil litigation.215 In subsection (h),
the Executive Order provides:
To the extent permissible by law ... in any civil litigation initiated
by the United States, litigation counsel shall offer to enter into a
two-way fee-shifting agreement with opposing parties to the dis-
pute, whereby the losing party would pay the prevailing party's
fees and costs, subject to reasonable terms and limitations. The
Attorney General shall review the legal authority for entering into
such agreements.21 6
The Executive Order also commands that where existing legislation
does indeed proceed without substantial justification, the claimant has recourse to the EAJA.
See supra notes 169-170 and accompanying text. Encouraging private enforcement of justice:
see discussion supra part III.B.4.
212. See Acrambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (denouncing general two-way
shifting).
213. Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991) [hereinafter Executive Order].
214. The introductory paragraph to the Executive Order reads, in part:
WHEREAS, the tremendous growth in civil litigation has burdened the American
court system and has imposed high costs on American Individuals, small
businesses, industry, professionals, and government at all levels;
WHEREAS, several current litigation practices add to these burdens and costs by
prolonging the resolution of disputes, thus delaying just compensation and
encouraging wasteful litigation;
WHEREAS, the harmful consequences of these litigation practices may be
ameliorated by encouraging voluntary dispute resolution, limitations on
unnecessary discovery, judicious use of expert testimony, prudent use of
sanctions, improved use of litigation resources, and, where appropriate, modified
fee arrangements; ....
NOW, THEREFORE, I GEORGE BUSH .... hereby [issue the Executive Order].
Id.
215. The order was directed to "those Federal agencies and litigation counsel that conduct
and otherwise participate in civil litigation on behalf of the United States Government in
Federal Court .... " Id. at § 1.
216. Id. at § 1(h).
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does not empower an agency to enter a fee-shifting agreement, the
agency should make "legislative proposals" to that end when review-
ing its policies.21 7 The order naturally encompasses civil forfeiture
proceedings.218
None of the statutes presently regulating forfeiture contain provi-
sions empowering an agency bringing a forfeiture suit to offer the
opponent a fee-shifting agreement.21 9 In fact, current federal regula-
tions specifically direct federal agencies not to consider attorney fees
as part of the interest of the innocent owner in forfeiture proceed-
* 220 W ietings. While the Executive Order directs federal agencies reviewing
their procedures to take steps to incorporate fee-shift offers into their
regulations, it is unclear whether Congress will follow the efforts of
the Bush administration. Congress received the President's proposal
with little enthusiasm, and it is unlikely that the Clinton administra-
tion will continue to push for civil justice reform.22'
2. THE EFFECTS OF A TWO-WAY FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION IN THE
FORFEITURE CONTEXT
The two-way shift proposed by the Executive Order would
217. "(a) General Duty to Review Legislation and Regulations. Within current budgetary
constraints and existing executive branch coordination mechanisms ... each agency that is
promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, developing legislative proposals
concerning regulations, and developing new legislation shall adhere to [the order] .. " Id. at
§ 2(a).
218. The Executive Order specifically mentions civil forfeiture proceedings in subsection
7(b), which provides that the pre-filing notice to the opponent provision therein is inapplicable
in "any action to seize or forfeit assets subject to forfeiture." Id. at § 7(b). That exclusion
ostensibly harmonizes the Executive Order with Supreme Court precedent such as Calero-
Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677 (1974). In Calera Toledo, the Court
agreed that forfeiture seizure is one of those" 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing
notice and opportunity for a hearing" until after seizure. Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 90 (1972)). The effort to except forfeiture suits from the Executive Order's notice
requirement makes sense only if forfeiture suits are otherwise encompassed by the order.
219. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
220. 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.6 regulate the return of certain property to claimants after a
determination of innocent ownership or after a forfeiture failed otherwise. Subsection 9.2 (h)
provides that the government must return net equity, the owner's monetary interest in the
subject property, to the owner in case of an aborted forfeiture. In particular, the section
provides:
Net equity is to be computed by determining the amount of unpaid principal and
unpaid interest at the time of seizure, and by adding to that sum unpaid interest
calculated from the date of seizure through the last full month prior to the date
of the notification granting the petition .... In this computation, however, there
shall be no allowances for ... attorney's fees, or other similar charges.
28 C.F.R. § 9.2(h) (1991).
221. At the time this Comment goes to print, more than fifteen months after the President
released his Executive Order on Civil Justice Reform, Congress has not shown any initiative to
fundamentally reform the civil justice system on its own terms.
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doubtlessly affect claimants in forfeiture proceedings. The order
directs agencies involved in civil litigation to offer opposing litigants a
fee shift. A literal reading of the Executive Order indicates that if
forfeiting agencies comply with the order and offer the claimant a fee
shift, the claimant could decide at the outset of a forfeiture suit
whether or not to gamble on entering a fee-shifting agreement.222
Such a system would seem to favor all claimants by giving them
the opportunity to choose-an opportunity not given to the govern-
ment.223 Wealthy, less risk averse claimants would be at a distinct
advantage compared to litigants of modest means, who are generally
more risk averse.224 Wealthy litigants would be more likely to take
advantage of an offered fee shift than poor litigants. Assuming that
poor litigants would not readily accept the gamble of a fee-shifting
agreement, one can predict that litigants of modest means would be
largely unaffected by the proposed fee shift. That shortcoming does
not necessarily render the proposal ineffective. Wealthy claimants
may be just as innocent as poor claimants and thus equally deserving
of added protection. Perhaps, it is a step in the right direction at least
to give affluent litigants a better chance to vindicate their rights.225 At
a minimum, the suggested system is better suited to the forfeiture con-
text than the English rule, under which risk averse litigants must
either risk having to pay the government's bill or allow the govern-
222. One must not confuse the system suggested by the Executive Order with a pure two-
way system (essentially the English rule). Under a pure two-way system, fee-shifting is
mandatory. Any litigating party must pay the other party's attorneys' fees if that party
prevails. The Executive Order, on the other hand, suggests a scenario where the federal
agency would offer a fee shift to the opponent.
223. The Executive Order should be welcome news to all litigants against the government.
If the scheme envisioned by the Executive Order becomes reality, a private litigant against the
government could assess the situation before accepting or rejecting a fee shift. The
government would have to offer fee shifting regardless of the strength of its case and would,
therefore, be at a distinct disadvantage. Of course, the proposed scheme would favor not only
innocent owners but also hard-core drug dealers. One may rightfully question whether we
should indiscriminately handicap the government against all private litigants.
224. See supra note 165. Note that, while the situational factor "risk aversity" produces
contrasting results between poor and affluent litigants, other situational factors do not. For
example, the "perceived strength of the case" factor, supra text accompanying note 168,
influences both groups of potential claimants in similar fashion: the stronger they believe their
case to be, the more likely they will be to pursue it. Like other situational factors, the
perceived strength of the case will have essentially the same effect under the traditional
American rule (now in force), as under one- or two-way shifting schemes. No matter what the
fee scheme, cases perceived to be strong will more likely be pursued than weak ones. This
Comment will not discuss such factors.
225. For wealthy claimants with low risk aversity, the proposed elective two-way shift
would likely improve their access to justice. Where the claimants actually accept the offer to
enter a fee-shifting agreement, they have at least the chance to be made whole, though they
have the risk of having to pay their own and the government's fees.
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ment to keep their property unchallenged.226
The advantage offered to wealthy litigants under the scheme
envisioned by the Executive Order raises issues of equality and fair-
ness.227 The proposal does little, in essence, for litigants of modest
means. This Comment seeks a solution to the dilemma of all innocent
owners. The Executive Order does not provide such a solution.
B. Pure One-Way, Pro-Claimant Shifting
Most problems created by elective two-way shifting in the forfei-
ture context would not exist under a one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant
fee-shifting model. 228 Under such a system, the prevailing-claimant
always recovers attorney fees from the government, but not vice
versa. The Equal Access to Justice Act in many ways resembles a
one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant concept because it provides fees
only for "prevailing parties" against the government. As demon-
strated, the Act's narrow definition of "substantially justified" has
rendered the EAJA largely ineffective to protect innocent owners in
forfeitures. The EAJA could, however, be the basis for a legislative
amendment to § 881. Such an amendment could adopt the language
of the EAJA, but redefine the "substantially justified" standard for
forfeiture cases to mean "succeeding, in spite of an innocent owner-
ship claim, in the forfeiture action." Thus, if the innocent owner
prevails, the government was not substantially justified in its action.229
However, the EAJA's "substantially justified" concept need not
226. See supra part III.C.l.
227. For an in-depth discussion of issues of equality concerns for proposed legislation, see
Galanter, supra note 159, at 95.
228. "One-way, pro-prevailing-claimant" is not a common denomination for fee-shifting
provisions. Yet, fee shifts of the "pro-prevailing-claimant" type are numerous in today's laws,
though not commonly called by that name. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1992) (awarding all successful
claimants against the government in condemnation proceedings reasonable attorney fees).
It might appear convenient simply to call the forfeiture claimant either "plaintiff" or
"defendant," and then to discuss the issues in these terms. Yet, the courts do not agree on the
correct label of a forfeiture claimant. Properly, the claimant is an "intervenor" and, as such, is
neither plaintiff nor defendant. On the other hand, the claimant naturally takes a position
opposite that of the plaintiff, the government, and might thus be labelled "defendant." This
Comment will avoid unnecessary conceptualism and call the proposed fee-shifting provision a
"one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant model." Cf United States v. 122 Acres of Land, 856 F.2d
56 (8th Cir. 1988)(referring to claimants under the Act as "condemnees"); Florida Rock
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 9 Ct.Cl. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1985) (calling the claimant "plaintiff").
229. Such a reading of "substantially justified" clashes with the current positivist view
expressed in cases such as United States v. B&M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1988).
Given the discrepancy of burdens of proof between the government and claimant, one could
reasonably argue that, if the government cannot win on these odds, its claim could not have
been substantially justified.
[Vol. 47:147
CIVIL FORFEITURE
be part of a successful fee-shifting concept for forfeiture cases. In
eminent domain law, an area strikingly similar to forfeiture, Congress
has laid the groundwork for fee awards to victims of unsuccessful
deprivation attempts by the government. 230 The Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970231 gov-
erns eminent domain proceedings.2 32 That Act provides that real
property owners are entitled to reimbursement of legal expenses
incurred in defense against an unsuccessful governmental attempt to
take their property.233 The attorney fee provision in the Act is prop-
erly termed a mandatory one-way, pro-claimant fee shift. Notably,
expenses incurred in litigation under the Act are reimbursed only if
the government agency cannot prove its case or abandons the case.234
Moreover, the agency that brought the suit is liable for payment of
the owner's expenses.235
230. The "eminent domain" concept provides that the government can take property from
private owners for public purposes so long as it fairly compensates the owners. The Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that ". . . private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation." Courts usually find that a taking of private
property is permissible, even over the objections of the private owner, if the government pays a
fair price for a piece of property. For the utilitarian justification of the concept, see Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967). Frequently, the only
bothersome issue in eminent domain cases is what constitutes "just compensation." See, e.g.,
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973).
231. The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1970 is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651-54 (1991)[hereinafter Property Acquisition Act].
232. The Property Acquisition Act reads, in part:
§ 4651. UNIFORM POLICY ON REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION PRACTICES....
(8) If any interest in real property is to be acquired by exercise of the power of
eminent domain, the head of the Federal agency concerned shall institute formal
condemnation proceedings. No Federal agency head shall intentionally make it
necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the
taking of his real property.
42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1991).
233. In pertinent part, the Property Acquisition Act provides:
(a) Judgment for owner or abandonment of proceedings
The Federal court having jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted by a Federal
agency to acquire real property by condemnation shall award the owner of any
right, or title to, or interest in, such real property such sum as will in the opinion
of the court reimburse such owner for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and
expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually
incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, if-
(1) the final judgment is that the Federal agency cannot acquire the real
property by condemnation; or
(2) the proceeding is abandoned by the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1991).
234. See, e.g., Rocca v. United States, 500 F.2d 492, 496 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (denying fee award
to owners of land condemned by Congress rather than federal agency).
235. The payment provision of the Property Acquisition Act reads: "Any award made
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Civil forfeiture, if sought against an innocent owner, closely
resembles an unsuccessful eminent domain proceeding. Both types of
proceedings attempt to take private property for public purposes.
Both can deprive the owner who broke no law of her property. Both
can financially ruin the owner who is forced to defend her property.
In the words of the U.S. Court of Claims, the Act permits the owner
to be made whole for the expenses incurred in achieving victory.236
This Comment suggests no less: the innocent owner in forfeiture suits
must be made whole by the government for her expenses in achieving
victory. 21 U.S.C § 881 should be amended to include a fee-shifting
provision similar to that contained in the Property Acquisition Act.
The sections of the Property Acquisition Act providing that expenses
are paid only if the government cannot prove its case and that the
individual agency attempting the suit is liable for the expenses would
fit seamlessly into the amendment here proposed. The only require-
ment for the adaptation of the provisions of the Act to the forfeiture
context is a recognition by legislators that an unsuccessful forfeiture
attempt is the equivalent of an unsuccessful attempt to "take"
property. 2
37
A mandatory one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant fee shift would
advance several basic policies mentioned in connection with fee shifts
in general.238 A mandatory fee shift in favor of the successful claim-
ant would make every innocent owner whole. At the same time, the
elaborate judicial inquiry in forfeiture cases would guarantee fairness
by assuring that only worthy claimants benefit from fee shifting.
Moreover, a fee-shifting provision as suggested would give owners
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be paid by the head of the Federal agency for
whose benefit the condemnation proceedings was [sic] instituted." 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1991).
236. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., v. United States, 9 CI.Ct. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1985).
237. At least one court has ingeniously explained why a governmental attempt to take
forfeiture property is not really a taking:
If probable cause to seize the [property] did not exist, the DEA action would not
give rise to a Fifth Amendment taking claim. A taking within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment occurs when the rightful property, contract or regulatory
powers of the government are employed to control rights or property which have
not been purchased. No taking claim arises when rights or property have been
impaired through unlawful government action.
Golder v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 513, 518 (Cl. Ct. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). In other words: Because a government agency seeking forfeiture without probable cause
acts illegally, the Constitution does not protect the owner.
Such reasoning, of course, does not concern the innocent owner or the fee shift proposed
on her behalf. After all, innocent ownership comes into play only after the government has
shown probable cause. See supra note 4. Under the Golder rationale, there is no reason why
the forfeiture attempt should not be considered a taking at this point.
238. Other policy considerations are simply unaffected in the forfeiture context. See supra
text following note 146.
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who have a bona fide claim of innocence (as manifested by their suc-
cess in litigation) the access to justice they deserve. Notably, a
mandatory one-way shift would benefit claimants regardless of their
economic status. Because the suggested shift is one-way, the claimant
would run no risk of having to pay the government's fees if he fell
short of his high burden of proof. Thus, the competing considerations
inherent in two-way shifts would not exist under the proposed amend-
ment to the current forfeiture statute.
A welcome by-product of a one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant
shift is that poor claimants of a small res will have a better chance of
finding legal representation. Under the current system, poor litigants
are often unable to hire an attorney unless they promise the attorney
part of the res. If the res is small, such promises entice few. If an
attorney knows, however, that she will be fully compensated if she
defends the claimant well, she will be more likely to accept civil forfei-
ture suits.
Finally, the political feasibility of the proposed amendment to
§ 881 must be considered. Such a proposal may meet considerable
resistance in Congress, given the monetary benefits the government
receives from existing forfeiture laws. Yet, financial considerations
should not weigh heavily against the proposed amendment. 239 The
government may even profit in the long run from a one-way, pro-
prevailing-claimant fee-shifting provision. While such a provision
would initially cause higher government expenditures to cover fee
awards, the provision will eventually reduce waste of governmental
resources. By encouraging agencies to pursue only cases in which
they have evidence against the owner as well as against the property,
such a provision would reduce governmental litigation expenses on
losing causes.
In sum, a one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant shift has significant
advantages over the elective two-way shift proposed in President
Bush's Executive Order. A one-way shift dispenses equal justice
while the two-way shift does not. One-way fee shifting is particularly
suited in the forfeiture context, where parties of grossly unequal
strength confront each other. In contrast to the two-way shift, a one-
way shift could level the litigation plane between the government and
less resourceful private parties. The one-way, pro-claimant shift
239. Forfeitures currently produce more revenues than some police departments can spend.
The police in Little'Compton, R.I., for example, received more than $3 million from a single
forfeiture. After the department bought new guns and bulletproof vests, built a new firing
range and a tower for a new police radio system, added overtime shifts, and finally a new police
station, it still had $1.5 million it did not know how to spend. Cauchon, supra note 9, at 7A.
Obviously, some of these funds could be spent more sensibly.
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could consistently achieve the legislative policy underlying laws like
the Equal Access to Justice Act, namely compensation of innocent
individuals forced to expend resources fighting the government.
Thus, while the fee-shifting scheme envisioned in the Executive Order
improves the status quo for some litigants, only a one-way, pro-pre-
vailing-claimant shift will give all innocent owners the relief justice
requires.
VI. CONCLUSION
Turning and turning in the widening gyre of several recent
amendments, 21 U.S.C. § 881 cannot hold its ultimate promise: com-
batting drug traders2" for the benefit of innocent citizens. Some of
these citizens, found by courts to be "innocent owners" in forfeiture
suits, are forced to expend their life savings on legal representation to
assert their rights. They pay a disproportionate share of the cost of
the government's "war on drugs." No doubt, the current drug laws
are strong medicine for a serious illness. Yet, there is no reason why
innocent owners should endure more side effects than others. A sim-
ple fee-shifting provision in the forfeiture statute will effectively pro-
tect them.
This Comment does not suggest that drug dealers deserve a
break. It does not tread the same old path of complaining about the
abridgment of constitutional rights of accused drug-dealers. For bet-
ter or for worse, Congress and the Supreme Court have made it amply
clear that the protection of such rights is not high on their agenda.
However, the protection of innocent citizens must be. This Comment
suggests that innocent owners, who successfully jump through the
countless hoops held up by the law, should be made whole. If the
claimant overcomes the handicap of grossly uneven burdens of proof,
if the claimant perseveres in the absence of constitutional safeguards,
and if a competent court has determined that the claimant is innocent,
the government must indemnify that claimant. An elective two-way
shift could markedly improve the position of an innocent owner with
low risk aversity; however, because risk aversity is directly related to
240. According to the legislative history to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984:
Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to recognize
that the traditional criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs which, with
its inevitable attendant violence, is plaguing the country. Clearly, if law
enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be
successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of those crimes.
Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be made.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.
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economic status, an elective two-way shift favors affluent litigants
over poor litigants and so raises issues of fairness and equality. A
more efficient, but also more politically sensitive solution to the attor-
ney fee problem is the mandatory one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant
fee shift. Such a shift would be an acknowledgment of reality. It
would admit that the strict forfeiture laws, whatever their value, occa-
sionally injure innocent citizens. A one-way, pro-prevailing-claimant
fee shift would compensate every innocent owner, and would ensure
that civil forfeiture law fulfills its promise: hurt the bad guys; help the
good guys. Congress should amend § 881 with a one-way, pro-pre-
vailing-claimant fee-shifting provision to ensure that innocent prop-
erty owners do not get hurt by the laws designed to protect them.
CLAUDIO RIEDI
